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GLOSSARY TO ARABIC  AND SOMALI WORDS
Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a: A Somali paramilitary group, fighting to prevent fundamentalist 
Islam from being imposed on Somalia and protecting the country's 
Sufi traditions and a moderate religious view. 
Al-Islah: A Somali Islamic organization based on Sufism. Al-Islah is known 
as non militant and from its successful charity work during the civil 
war.    
Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya: Often referred to as al-Itihaad or AIAI. It is a defunct Islamist 
militant group with alleged ties to al-Qaeda.
Al-Tabliq: A Somali non militant Islamic organization based on Sufism. Tabliq 
is mostly known for their quietist proselytism, thus traveling around 
in the countryside to teach Islam.  
Al-Qaeda: A transnational network of militant Sunni Muslim organisations. In 
public known for 9/11 and hereafter for posing a terrorist threat to 
the Western world.         
Diya: A compensation paid by a person who has injured or killed another 
person. A diya-paying group is made up of between a few hundred 
to a few thousand men linked by lineage and a contractual 
agreement to support one another.
Fatwa: A legal opinion, decree or ruling issued by a mufti or other Islamic 
Lawyer.
Jihad: According to Muslim Jurists, there are four kinds of jihad fi 
sabilillah (struggle in the cause of God); Jihad of the heart, Jihad by 
the tongue, Jihad by the Hand and Jihad by the Sword. In western 
societies the term jihad is often translated as "holy war". Muslim 
authors tend to reject such an approach stressing non-militant 
connotations of the word.
Guurti: An elderate. In this project the House of Elders. It is the upper 
house in Parliament of Somaliland, and has 82 members, 
representing traditional leaders.
Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen: Movement of Warrior Youth, more commonly referred to as al- 
Shabaab.
Salafism: Orthodox or very conservative branch of Sunni Islam, stressing the 
devoted ancestors (Salaf) from the early Islam's patriarchal period 
as role models.
Shafi'ite: Is one of the four schools, or religious law, within Sunni Islam. The 
other three schools of law are Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali.
VI
Shari'a: Refers to the sacred law of Islam. All Shari'a is deriving from two 
primary sources, the  revelations set forth in the Qur'an, and the 
sayings and example set by Prophet Muhammad.  Because 
Muslims believe in Sharia's divine origin, each interpretation of 
Sharia is considered "God's law," and is therefore not subject to 
amendment by humans.
Shura:  An Arabic word for "consultation". It is believed to be the method 
by which pre-Islamic  Arabian selected leaders and made major 
decisions. In current project the Shura refers to the Supreme 
Council of the UIC; a body supervising the UIC.
Sufism: Is generally understood by scholars and Sufis to be the inner, 
mystical, or psycho-spiritual dimension of Islam. 
Sunni: The largest branch of Islam, covering approximately 80-90 percent 
of the world's Muslims. It  is also referred to as orthodox Islam and 
Ahl as-Sunnah wa’l-Jamā‘ah which means "people of the tradition 
(of Muhammad) and the community"
Wahhabism: Conservative orientation in Sunni Islam. It has been recognized as 
in accordance with the Hanbali doctrine
Qabil: Community or Clan
Xeer: Pronounced [ħeːr] is the polycentric legal system of Somalia. Under 
this system, elders serve as judges and help mediate cases using 
precedents.
Xissi Adkaaday: The most fundamental stipulations of xeer for which unquestioned 
historical precedents exist.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction to Paper
After  September 11th 2001 the concept  known as  weak,  fragile,  failing,  failed or 
collapsed states has gained increased attention. Previously, the biggest security threat 
to the world order was perceived to be posed by strong, aggressive states. However 
with the terrorist attacks on the United States, focus has moved to the failed states, 
the logic being, that the lack of order will attract terrorists who will use it as a safe 
zone to prepare attacks on the Western world.
Although these assumptions have led to a notably increased focus on failed states, 
little attention has been directed on looking into what happens in a country after the 
state  has  failed.  The  main  tendency  is  to  perceive  this  stage  as  disordered  and 
chaotic.  There are  some scholars  that  do acknowledge that  state  failure does not 
result in complete anarchy, however, this is where most reasoning stops. When the 
mechanisms that constitute some amount of order are not recognised, there seems to 
be only one way to go from there, that is, to rebuild the dysfunctional state apparatus.
Somalia is counted as one of the archetypical examples of a failed state. As Ken 
Menkhaus puts it, it is even a failure among failed states (Menkhaus 2004). De facto, 
they have been without a functional state since 1991, and they are thus one among 
five  countries  that  have  the  most  extreme label  within  failed  states  according to 
Rotberg (2003), in that it is described as a ‘collapsed’ state1 (Kraxberger 2007: 6). On 
the Failed State Index by the Peace Fund, Somalia is rated as number one amongst 
all countries in the world (Peace Fund 2009).
This  paper  will  address  this  absence  of  a  functional  state  apparatus  in  Somalia. 
Unlike other scholars, we shall attempt not to avoid the complexity of the structures 
in Somalia, by simply denoting it a failed state. The failed state concept, implies that 
the country is in a state of chaos, because of a failed top-down driven development 
approach, not able to comprise all parts of society. When constantly approaching the 
1 The other four states classified as collapsed counts Sudan, Burundi and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo
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problems  in  Somalia  as  consequences  of  a  failed  state,  it  implies  that  sovereign 
statehood  is  a  precondition  for  political  order,  stability,  development  and 
reconciliation. Rather we suggest to understand the state as a privilege for a country 
in its final form.
Historically,  approaches  towards  countries  without  a  functional  institutional 
structure, has been attempts to rebuild the state, relying on a predominantly top-down 
driven approach. By addressing other governance structures within Somalia, we shall 
avoid the mistake of denoting Somalia as a state that has ever existed in its final 
form. A centralised Somali state apparatus existed for merely 31 years (1960-1991)2, 
making  it  difficult  to  argue  for  a  complete  consolidation,  yet  even  more  for  a 
complete break-down of institutional structures for the newborn country.
Attempts to rebuild the state can happen through three pathways: top-down, bottom-
up or a combination of both. Rebuilding of statehood, however, is to a large degree 
based on the international consensus on the sovereign nation-state being the only 
solution  to  governance,  not  only  internationally,  but  domestically  as  well.  It 
implicates a process of restoration, and to return to something, which has never really 
been in a Somali context.
The many international attempts to create a Somali state, which have not yet been 
able to comprise or unite society, suggests that the statelessness reigning in Somalia, 
should be assessed differently, with the externally imposed attempts, having no more 
basis in local political cultures than the parchment on which they are inscribed. So, 
while the international community has got some kind of responsibility in making 
coherence between its de jure recognition of Somalia as a country, and Somalia’s de 
facto lack of viability, it seems like externally funded reconciliation governments, is 
a very fallible way to do so.
The Somali situation, however, might not only be a result from failed approaches, but 
could also be stemming from wrong assumptions of what should be ensuring order in 
2 Even during the Barre regime from 1969-1991 it can be argued that the state was not complete.  
For the somilis the state became something to avoid entirely (Menkhaus 2009).
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a political  community.  The African State has been questioned by several scholars 
suggesting that the state might not be the only polity of a political community. Thus, 
Mansbach  and  Ferguson  argues  that  “polities  are  always  changing  or  becoming, 
sometimes coming from or moving toward another  polity type” (Ferguson et.  al. 
1996: 396). It follows from the above, that this paper will be built on the assumption 
that the state should not be perceived as static. Rather, it should be considered as 
continuously changing according to the reality where it exists. Harry Verhoeven adds 
an extra dimension to this point emphasising that the state should not be “considered 
to be an eternal given, but rather one out of many forms that legitimate political 
authority can take” (Verhoeven 2009: 408). He further argues that a state’s capacities 
varies across time and space, and should therefore be understood as characterising 
for the specific context rather than a fixed category (Verhoeven 2009: 411).
Hence, state failure or collapse should not be understood as the failure of a static 
entity, but rather as a step in an ongoing process where a new political order will 
emerge. In other words, the disappearing of one sovereign state power will result in 
other  groups  emerging,  that  eventually  will  be  constituting  a  new  sovereign.  It 
follows from the above, that the aim of this paper, is not to create an international 
solution to the lack of a central state in Somalia, but rather to account for the already 
existing structures within society. Rather than perceiving statehood as an 'end-stage' 
and the term 'failed state'  as  a  stage from where one can only go back,  we will 
understand state failure as part of a process, where viable legitimate authority is not 
yet achieved.
The question is then, whether the failed state literature is appropriate for assessing 
the underdeveloped institutional structures within Somalia. Before answering this, it 
is necessary to review the literature and discuss its implications. Since Somalia is no 
less than always referred to as the archetypical example of a state collapse, we cannot 
simply  dismiss  the  literature  and  its  policy  recommendations.  Rather,  we  shall 
attempt to contextualise it to the underlying thesis of the paper, that is, what exists 
when the state does not.
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The point of departure is to a great extent derived from the failures of the externally 
imposed state building attempts within Somalia, which we will dismiss as a pathway 
for further development of institutional structures. Turning away from the top-down 
driven state-building approach led by the international community, explicitly means a 
turning to the bottom-up governance formations that exist within the state borders.
1.2 Introduction to Case
Throughout the past approximately 20 years Somalia has been classified as a failed 
and  even  as  a  collapsed  state  (Kraxberger  2007:  6).  Apart  from  the  lack  of  a 
functioning  state  apparatus,  some  of  the  visible  symptoms  of  the  problems  that 
Somalia still faces today are the lack of rule of law, famine and malnutrition, civil 
war, an enormous number of refugees and piracy (Møller 2009: 5).  
The  international  society  has  made  several  attempts  to  deal  with  the  situation. 
Between 1992 and 1995 these attempts were embodied by two UN interventions, 
UNOSOM-I and UNOSOM-II and one UN mandated yet essentially only US led 
intervention,  UNITAF.  Due  to  a  lack  of  mandate  and  hence  resources,  poor 
coordination and a disastrous strategy to mention a few reasons, it ended with the 
killing of 18 US troops and between 300 and 1000 Somalis on October the 3rd
 
1993, 
later referred to and known as the 'The Black Hawk Down'.3 After this all troops 
were withdrawn (Møller 2009: 12-13). In 2000 a different strategy was pursued. Led 
by foreign actors a number of Somalis joined a major conference in Arta in Djibouti,  
with the end result being the establishment of a Transitional National Government 
(TNG) for  Somalia.  In  2004 this  was formally replaced by different  Transitional 
Federal  Institutions  (TFI)  most  importantly  being  the  Transitional  Federal 
Government (TFG). Although both the TNG and the TFG have enjoyed recognition 
from the international society, they never had any real power within Somalia. It has 
even been suggested that these governments were hardly present in Somalia, and that 
their power reached its maximum during one week when they managed to control 
half of the street on which the government building is located (Møller 2009: 14-15; 
3 Most famously known from Ridley Scott's movie from 2001 on the incident.
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Jackson 2007).
The attempts  on state  building mentioned above are only examples  of  the many 
failed attempts that added together makes Somalia the country that holds the world 
record  in  externally  sponsored  reconciliation  initiatives  that  have  failed.  As  it 
appears, the end results of these different attempts to ‘fix’ Somalia did not have the 
intended positive effect, and they have even left Somalia worse off than it was before 
(Møller 2009:5; Menkhaus 2004). Partly due to these failures, Somalia has also been 
left alone for long periods.
The strategy from international side, to leave Somalia alone has not only been a bad 
thing for the country. Different domestic forces have been emerging from the Somali 
society itself, and have in some periods managed to create some kind of order. The 
most striking example of this remain throughout the second half of 2006, when the 
Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), took over the power from the nonfunctioning and 
nothing controlling TFG in Mogadishu, and exercised the phenomena which in social 
sciences  is  known  as  ‘governance  without  government’.  In  the  UIC’s  period  of 
governing, Somalia is by a number of authors described to have been the most stable 
and  secure  throughout  the  past  twenty  years.  On  this  background,  the  UIC  is 
suggested to have been influential  enough to play a role in the resolution of the 
Somali conflict (Møller 2009; Menkhaus 2007; Marchal 2004). The success of the 
UIC did however not last long. In the beginning of 2007, Ethiopia backed by the US, 
intervened and defeated the UIC.
1.3 Research Field
On this background it seems paradoxical that the UIC, as the first body that managed 
to establish some kind of stability and order for the first time in fifteen years, was 
effectively  removed.  The  UIC  was  not  an  externally  driven  attempt,  but  on  the 
contrary  based  on  the  structures  and  values  deriving  from  the  civil  society  of 
Somalia, most importantly being the customary and Shari'a law. As such it appears 
that they must have had a  different level  of accountability to the Somali  people. 
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Furthermore, they were not depending on external funding, but managed to create 
structures that enabled them to accumulate resources themselves. These advantages 
and abilities of the UIC, both managing and providing a modest level of security in a 
context of state collapse, seem to have been virtually invisible to external observers, 
whose sole preoccupation apparently have been with the one form of organisation 
that actually provides the least amount of security and rule of law to Somalis - the 
central state.
There is probably no other issue, on which the world views of external actors and 
Somalis diverge more, than their radically different understanding of the state. For 
external  actors,  the conventional  wisdom is  that  an effective state  is  an essential 
prerequisite for development, a proposition included in virtually every World Bank 
and  UN  strategy  on  development  in  Somalia  (John  2008).  For  many  Somalis, 
however, the state is an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and 
empowering  those  who  control  it  while  exploiting  and  harassing  the  rest  of  the 
population (ibid.).
Ken Menkhaus, who has studied the turbulence of Somalia over the past 15 years, 
recognises that Somalia contains a number of various local authorities, which have 
potential to be stabilising factors in the country, if facilitated wisely and promoted 
correctly (Menkhaus 2007). However,  as stated before,  this  has often been found 
incongruent with the nature of all failed state building initiatives these past years, by 
external engagements. Menkhaus finds that the surrounding world ought to change 
its view upon what a state is - and should be - in Somalia, because the conditions and 
means to  establish a  strong and centralised power do not exist  at  all  (Menkhaus 
2008). The framework for this paper partly derives from Menkhaus' thesis, that the 
Westphalian state system, as imposed on Somalia from the previous colonial powers, 
seems to have failed.
The external attempts to help Somalia have always been applied with the aim to 
impose a Somali central state, but in this paper, the international community's focus 
upon the implementation of a centralised state is considered inadequate for future 
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development, not at least because of the origins of the modern central state, which 
we shall elaborate upon later.
The framework for this paper therefore derives from certain assumptions, based upon 
other  scholars  work  on the  legacy -and  lack-  of  a  central  state  in  Somalia.  The 
assumptions have served as a point of departure for further research and as an offset 
for the formulation of the research and sub questions, and shall be elaborated later.
1.4 Assumptions
1.5 Research Question
On this background, the following research question has been developed:
Answering this we will take use of the following sub-questions:
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•There exists no efficient and central state apparatus in Somalia.
•All externally driven attempts to the creation of a central government in Somalia so 
far have failed and represent a top-down driven approach to state building.
•While no state, other organisations exist within Somalia in the era of statelessness, 
that structures and governs communities.
•Statehood should be seen as a continuous process rather than an end state. Thus, 
state failure is only one step in the process where a political community tries to 
establish the form of legitimate order that fits into the context and the reality.
“Is the concept of a failed state appropriate in describing Somalia and did the 
Union  of  Islamic  Courts  pose  a  legitimate  authority,  constituting  an 
alternative to a Somali central state throughout the second half of 2006 in 
South-Central Somalia?”
Failed Approaches to a Failed State – Somalia and the Union of Islamic Courts
1.6 Delimitations
As mentioned in  the research question we shall  be focusing primarily on South-
Central Somalia, with the timeline culminating in the second half of 2006, as this 
was the period and the domain of the UIC in power, at its peak.
Though the few recent articles that can be traced on the subject of Somalia suggest, 
that the Islamic courts  currently have managed to defeat the still  not functioning 
TFG, and thus once again are in control of majority parts of South-Central Somalia, 
this period is not included. The reasoning behind this choice is that, in spite of the 
apparent similarity, there are also essential differences between the two periods. First 
of all, contrary to the first period of the UIC's rule, this time around the Courts are 
led and dominated by the radical Islamic faction,  Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen 
(al-Shabaab). From what can be read, al-Shabaab is proceeding towards what could 
be referred to as a second ‘Talebanistan’; ignoring several basic human rights while 
implementing a strict version of Shari'a law (Information 2010). Whereas the citizens 
in general are said to have welcomed and supported UIC in the first period of their 
rule, this is apparently not the case now, due to the immense radicalisation. Secondly, 
the uprising and radicalisation of al-Shabaab, is by several scholars and observers 
suggested to be a reaction against the international intervention led be Ethiopia late 
December 2006, marking a  turning point in Somali contemporary history (Krath 
05.16.10, Times 2009, Møller 2009: 23-24). Hence, although the Islamic courts are 
back in power by name, it should not be considered the same phenomenon as the 
UIC anno 2006.
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• What does traditional notions of the state imply,  and is it  applicable to 
describe Somalia?
• Which other structures can ensure order in a political community?
• What must a legitimate authority provide?
• Why is the UIC not perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the international 
society?
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The domain of the research is limited to South-Central Somalia. Hence, we are not 
focusing on the matters regarding either Somaliland or Puntland, because these areas 
were  not  under  the  domain  of  the  UIC,  and  have  had  a  completely  distinct 
development from Somalia in the post-Barre era which includes their governance 
structures  and  level  of  stability.4 We  shall  therefore  only  touch  upon  these 
developments when interesting in relation to our case.
Our analysis originates from the framework of statehood, which means that domestic 
actors are the primary target of analysis. Hence, only international actors that are 
known to have had an active or significant influence on the case in question and on 
its  development,  is  included.  This  means,  that  in  order  to  answer  the  research 
question in a reasonable manner, we have had to exclude certain actors, although 
they could have been relevant in an analysis of the Somalia case during the UIC, had 
another angle been employed.5
The UIC will be treated primarily as a political phenomenon, rather than a religious 
movement. However, the ideology of the UIC is based on an Islamic foundation, so 
in  this  matter  religion is  crucial.  Islamism must  in  the words of  Andrea Teti,  be 
understood as thoroughly modern phenomenon in line with other modern policies 
utilising mass appeal, organisation and tactics as political tools (Teti 2008: 218-232). 
Hence, although Islam is a large part of the UIC, and Somalia in general, we will not 
go into a thorough analysis of the who's, the how's and the why's, according to Islam. 
Rather  we  recognise  Islam  as  a  major  element  is  the  Somali  society,  and 
acknowledge the difference between spiritual Islam, and political Islam.
4 Somaliland  is  a  territory  located  in  the  North-Western  part  of  Somalia.  It  is  regarded  as 
internationally  as  being  an  autonomous  region  of  Somalia,  although  no  sovereign  state  have 
recognised its independence. Since 1991 it has been governed by a secessionist administration as 
the  Republic  of  Somaliland   Puntland  is  a  region  in  North-Eastern  part  of  Somalia  covering 
approximately  a  third  of  Somalia's  geographic  area.  Puntland  was  declared  an  autonomous 
province  of  Somalia  in  1998,  but  does  not  seeks  outright  independence  from  Somalia. 
(Constitution of Somaliland; Constitution of Puntland)
5 For example, the African Union and their  operations within Somalia is not considered, nor is the 
Arab League or other actors operational within Somali borders and in Somali policies, domestic 
and internationally.
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Finally, our paper is, of course, based upon theoretical assumptions and conducted by 
positioned  researchers.  We  have  attempted  to  abstain  from  normative  policy 
recommendations from a Euro-centric perspective, and we find that our conclusions 
are attained in a logical analysis between tendencies on empirical and actual level. 
Nonetheless, our case is based only upon the events leading up to and culminating in 
2006, which means that current scenarios and developments in Somalia are not taken 
into consideration.
1.7 Research Strategy
The inspiration for this paper has taken its point of departure in the literature from 
the  course  ‘Global  Politics,  Global  Governance,  Regionalization  and  State 
Sovereignty’. In this course, challenges to the established, realist based international 
order  organised  around  of  the  concept  of  sovereign  states  has  been  discussed. 
Accordingly,  this  is  exactly  the  framework  of  this  paper;  a  critical  input  to  the 
discussion  of  the  significance  and  appropriateness  of  state  sovereignty  as  a 
precondition  for  everything  else,  with  a  focus  on  a  non-state  actor  that  could 
constitute  a  legitimate  governance  alternative,  domestically as  well  as  externally. 
Therefore, the legitimacy of foreign interventions based on the idea of the sovereign 
state is also put into question.
The questions we have asked and the hypotheses we have deduced from structures 
and actors in a single setting and a limited time period; South-Central Somalia in 
2006, means that current paper is based upon a case study design. The advantage of 
the  case  study  research  design  is  that  it  allows  us  to  focus  on  a  specific  and 
interesting case and isolate the processes and structures that are taking place, making 
our single case study a 'whole' study in itself. The exploratory case study is a study 
that  is  undertaken  before  doing  a  large-scale  investigation.  Where  considerable 
uncertainty exists about program operations, goals, and results - the exploratory case 
study help us to identify questions, select measurement and develop hypotheses. It 
has  been necessary to  specify the  exact  questions  and variables  that  we wish to 
investigate,  in  order  to  direct  our  research  towards  certain  phenomena,  while 
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excluding others (Bryman 2004).
Because the phenomenon to be investigated – the emergence of governance in the 
absence of a central state – is of a rather abstract nature, we have had to make a 
research strategy that is based first and foremost on contextualisation of phenomena. 
Therefore we have found it necessary, after gaining a broader insight on Somalia, its 
actors and its turning points, to establish the assumptions presented above that  has 
directed  us,  and  worked  as  an  offset,  towards  an  answer  to  research-  and  sub-
questions. Although our ontology is empirically founded we attain our conclusions 
through theoretical discussions. The research method of retroduction is a "...mode of 
inference in which events are explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms 
which are capable of producing them..." (Sayer 1992:107). Retroduction is therefore 
appropriate  since  our  observations  of  apparent  causalities  are  identified  through 
induction,  and hereafter leads  to a deduction of hypotheses.  This means,  that the 
observable phenomena and the explicit actions of the UIC on empirical level, is not 
the  focal  point  of  analysis,  but  rather  is  an  offset  to  analyse  the  underlying 
mechanisms, structures and causalities that takes place in the absence of statehood in 
Somalia.
Not only is our conclusions attained in the 'exploratory phase', but also, the method 
of retroduction implies that conclusions are estimated, since they are attained through 
a  contextualisation  of  empirical  and theoretical  discussions.  Our hope is  that  the 
reader will understand the conclusions as a rational argumentation of the empirical 
evidence  put  forth.  Our  intention  with  this  paper  is  to  lay  the  foundation  for  a 
reasoned debate, and question the universality and applicability of statehood, rather 
than to establish scientific truths.
1.7.1 Data Collection
Unlike in other research designs, there are no strict set of rules for the data collection 
in a case study. Data is drawn from various sources, and conclusions drawn upon this 
data  (Bryman  2004).  In  our  data  collection  we  have  made  use  of  triangulation 
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meaning, that the events explained are supported by various sources and that we have 
not found contradictory evidence. That being said, newer literature on Somalia and 
particularly the UIC is somewhat limited and tends to constitute secondary analyses. 
In fact; according to a conversation with Senior Researcher at Danish Institute of 
International Studies Bjørn Møller, in March 2010, few researchers on Somalia have 
actually been there, and the ones who have, have usually limited themselves and their 
fieldwork to  the area of the North-West,  that  we know as  Somaliland.  We have, 
however, attempted to rely only on the most updated or acknowledged analyses on 
Somalia, including among others those deriving from Professor Ken Menkhaus and 
Dr.  Andre  Le  Sage,  that  are  commonly  quoted  among  researchers  and  scholars 
writing on the Somali conflict.
Furhtermore, important information has been drawn from statements and documents 
from  the  UIC  and  the  TFG  as  well  as  other  actors  related  to  the  case  (UN, 
Somaliland, Puntland). This implicates that a document analysis has been conducted, 
in  an  attempt  to  discover  real  meanings  and  values,  from those  that  are  stated. 
Although it has been possible to trace a few statements from the UIC, the access to 
formal written agendas has been limited. This is most likely connected to the fact that 
the UIC, all other things equal, was constituted of very different components, making 
it difficult to articulate one common agenda and therefore, that few such documents 
exist.
We have supported our research through interviews with respectively Bjørn Møller 
and Rasmus Krath, because we have found that each of them represents a particular 
knowledge  on  Somalia  post-1991.  Bjørn  Møller,  PhD  and  Senior  Researcher  at 
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), has as his expertise among others 
African Conflicts and Religion and Politics and has through 2009 alone published 
four reports on Somalia. Bjørn Møller was a help in providing a broad overview on 
Somalia and the vast amount of research conducted on the country post 1991, as well 
as critically assessing the reasoning behind his own conclusions. Rasmus Krath on 
the other hand, dedicated traveler and free-lance journalist, represents 'the man in the 
field', a rare phenomenon in the case of Somalia. He is most well known for directing 
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and instructing  the documentary 'På rejse med Kamera og Kalashnikov' (Traveling 
with Camera and Kalashnikov), documenting piracy in the town Eyl in Somalia, and 
in that connection interviewing the locals and gaining an insight in everyday life and 
perceptions on micro-level. The combination of their statements, interpretations and 
opinions,  on theoretical  and empirical  level  respectively,  has  been to  much help, 
where literature was lacking or not specific.
1.7.2 Theoretical Framework
The continuing political crisis in Somalia, the flaws of the international society to 
prevent  it,  and  the  emergence  of  alternative  governance  structures  because  of  it, 
raises theoretical questions about the very concept of the state itself (Clapham 2004; 
Herbst  2008)  as  well  as  empirical  challenges  to  its  right  pathway  and   form. 
Mainstream theory on the failed state, deriving from the West, is an area of interest 
because of normative reasons (Carment et. al. 2010), and will in many instances fail 
to grasp the reality, because of their inherent western approach to social phenomena. 
By distinguishing the features of the state as it is perceived in the social sciences, 
drawing reference to the classic scholars Max Weber, Thomas Hobbes and Niccolô 
Machiavelli,  we shall  draw the baseline  for  a  discussion  of  the implications  and 
connotations of the term – and theory behind – state failure. By assessing theories 
that fall outside the western dogmatic framework, we shall discuss the ”failed state” 
in  relation to  the Somali  context,  discussing its  applicability and not  at  least,  its 
implications for previous and future policies in Somalia.
1.7.2.1 Conceptual Clarifications
In this  part  we shall  clarify our use of certain key concepts  that  will  be applied 
continuously throughout this paper.
States or nation states are used to describe the organising sovereign within a country. 
States can vary in their internal organisation, however when using these terms we are 
solely referring to the sovereign, not depending on e.g. regime type. In part 3.1. the 
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concept shall be further clarified.
Country,  territory,  society and  political community are concepts that will  be used 
interchangeably to describe everything that is within the territory of the state, but is 
not the state apparatus. That is, the arena within which a state has certain obligations.
Legitimate  Authority  is  a  governing  entity  enjoying  high  legitimacy  within  a 
community. We shall elaborate on this in chapter 4.
1.8 Outline of the Paper
The paper is divided into seven chapters, of which the first five are leading up to the 
conclusion.
In the introduction (chapter 1) the main framework of the paper was elaborated and 
clarified.  This  included  an  introduction  to  the  primary  theroetical  and  empirical 
context of our case, presentation of the research question as well as an elaboration 
upon research strategy and data collection.
Chapter 2 is an introduction to Somalia, its history and its people, in order to define 
those influences and characterista that are defining for the case in question. It serves 
as a point of departure for  empirical contextualisation.
In chapter 3, we shall present and discuss the common perceptions of the state and of 
state  failure,  to  consider  whether  these  assumptions  are  adequate  in  describing 
Somalia,  hence serving as our theoretical framework. Furthermore, we shall address 
four different approaches to failed states, to discuss which approaches seem most 
reasonable when addressing Somalia.
In chapter 4, it shall be analysed, how and to which extent, the UIC constituted a 
legitimate authority domestically, with particular focus upon the latter half of 2006. 
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Building  on  the  conclusions  derived  from  chapter  3,  the  chapter  starts  with  an 
outlining  of  the  most  essential  functions  that  should  be  upheld  by  a  legitimate 
authority. It will be argued that security, rule of law and generation of revenues are of 
particular importance, and the analysis is therefore structured around each of these 
parameters.
Chapter 5 takes its point of departure in the fact that the UIC was not considered a 
legitimate authority by external actors, which was consolidated with the Ethiopian 
intervention in late December 2006.  Having established the rules of recognition, we 
shall discuss which international interests that were decisive for the UIC's lack of 
external  recognition;  the incongruence between domestic  and external  legitimacy, 
and finally, discuss the value of the security threat that the UIC was perceived to 
constitute.
Finally,  chapter 6 serves as our conclusion, and the results of the aforementioned 
chapters shall be presented, while chapter 7 allows us to go beyond the results of our 
analysis and discuss Somalia today.
2 INTRODUCTION TO SOMALIA
In this chapter we shall present the main contextual elements of our case. First, we 
shall be looking into the overall lines of Somali post-colonial history. Secondly, we 
shall account for the main characteristics of the Somali people.     
2.1 Historical Overview
2.1.1 Before 1991
July 1st  1960, after more than 70 years of European domination, the new nation-state 
of Somalia was proclaimed, after Britain withdrew from British Somaliland to allow 
its  protectorate  to  join  with  Italian  Somaliland  (Menkhaus  2004).  The  two 
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legislatures met in a joint session in Mogadishu and formally joined to form the new 
republic's assembly, electing a president, and after some time, managed to form a 
cabinet representing all the major parties in the north and south and all the major clan 
groupings.  Although the UN 'experiment'  in  Somalia had worked in the sense of 
providing a Europeanised central state, no serious thought had been given to how 
appropriate  these  would  become  in  conjunction  with  the  decentralised  nature  of 
traditional Somali political institutions (Lewis 2008).
In 1969, a coup led by Mohamed Siyad Barre imposed an authoritarian socialist rule 
in the country, with strong ties to the Soviet Union, allowing it to build one of the 
strongest  standing armies  in  Africa.  Initially,  when Barre  came to  power,  it  was 
greeted with broad public support signifying an end with the clannishness that had 
disenchanted the Somalis during the civil rule. Barre's regime, however, turned after 
an  initial  period  of  enthusiastic  nation-building,  into  a  police  state,  marking  the 
period from 1977-1991 (Menkhaus 2004; Lewis 2008).
Somalia's first 17 years of independence (1960-1977) was marked by an absence of 
significant  armed  conflicts  (Menkhaus  2004).  Concentration  was  put  upon  local 
development and consolidation of the regime's authority, however between 1977 and 
1991, the country suffered three major armed conflicts. The first one, the Ogaden 
War, was with Ethiopia in 1977-1978, in which Somali forces intervened in support 
of Somali rebel fighters to expel Ethiopians from Somali ethnic territory in the region 
of Ogaden. The Soviet Union however came to Ethiopian defence,   and Somalia 
suffered  approximately 25,000 casualities in its conflict with Ethiopia (ibid.), and 
some  400,000  refugees  from  East-Ethiopia  („West-Somalia”)  were  registered  in 
camps in December 1979. One year later the figure had more than doubled (Lewis 
2008). These losses lay the foundation for future internal conflict, and a return to 
tribalism, resulting in the rise of several Somali liberation movements, intending to 
overthrow  the  Barre  regime,  who  they  held  accountable  for  the  disaster.  An 
unsuccesful  coup was mounted against the regime in April 1978 (ibid.).6
6 The first of these movements was the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), established in  
1978. (Menkhaus 2004; Lewis 2008)
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The second major armed conflict was the war between the Somalia military and the 
Somalia National Movement (SNM) for control over the North-West of Somalia. The 
SNM was formed in 1981 by members of the Isaaq clan, because the Barre regime 
had placed the North-West under military control in the aftermath of the Ogaden 
War, and hit hard on the clan, dispossessing them their businesses and subjected them 
to political harassment (Menkhaus 2004; Lewis 2008). The civil war was mounted by 
the SNM in May 1988 as a response to Siyad Barre's peace accord with Ethiopia in 
April 1988, in fear of the consequences for the already vulnerable North-West (Lewis 
2008). The regime's response was an attempt to secure the loyalty of all non-Isaaq 
clans and penetrate the ranks of the Isaaq, exploiting the full lineage rivalry within 
the Somali nation (ibid.). The civil war produced a disaster: An estimated 50-60,000 
Somalis died, and 400,000 Somalis were forced to flee across the Ethiopian border as 
refugees, while another 400,000 were internally displaced (Menkhaus 2004). These 
terrible acts fuelled the Isaaq demands for secession in what became the self-declared 
state of Somaliland in 1991 (Menkaus 2004; Lewis 2008).
In  the  third  armed  conflict  in  Somalia  prior  to  1991,  armed  government  forces 
countered against a growing number of clan-based liberation movements in 1989 and 
1990.  The  multi-front  war  indicated  the  predatory  looting  and  banditry  that 
characterised the warfare in 1991-1992, characterised by great looting from both the 
side  of  the  warlords  factions  and  the  government,  ending  with  the  government 
fleeing from Mogadishu in January 1991 (Menkhaus 2004).
The expulsion of the Barre regime was not followed by a replacement government, 
but instead, by a long period of violent anarchy and warfare. Ioan Lewis argues that 
the  legacy  of  the  Barre  rule,  including  the  peace  agreement  with  Ethiopia, 
contributed  to  ensuing  a  period  after  his  expulsion,  in  which  the  Somali  nation 
became more deeply divided along clan lines,  than  at  perhaps  any other  time in 
history (Lewis 2008:76). Armed conflict raged across Southern Somalia through the 
1991 and 1992 period, where clan-based militias were fighting each other for control 
of valuable towns, seaports and neighbourhoods. The war began as a struggle for 
control of the government, but quickly turned into predatory looting, banditry and 
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occupation  of  valuable  real  estate  by  conquering  militias.  Battles  included  both 
different militia fractions, merchants and warlords (Menkhaus 2004; 2009)
In  1991 and  1992,  the  struggles  turned  into  a  massive  famine,  but  the  food aid 
became part of the war economy, a commodity over which militias fought, and which 
warlords distracted in order to fund the war. An estimated 250,000 Somalis died in 
this conflict and famine. By contrast, in the North- West and North-East of Somalia, 
the  collapse of  the  central  government  did not  result  in  the kind  of  warfare and 
plunder which devastated the south (Menkhaus 2004).
2.1.2 Foreign intervention 1993-1994
The  UN  intervention  in  Somalia  was  promoted  by  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the 
international community to protect food aid and help in the famine ravaging southern 
Somalia. It was initially a US-led, UN-sanctioned multilateral intervention involving 
nearly 30,000 troops. In 1993 the operation was formally handed over to the UN 
whose mandate was much more expansive, including instructions to assist Somalia in 
national reconciliation, rebuilding of a central government and reviving the Somali 
economy.  The  intervention  initially  succeeded  in  freezing  armed  conflicts  in  the 
country, which provided an opportunity for the main 15 Somali factions to meet and 
negotiate the framework for the terms of national reconciliation. Between June and 
October, however, UN and US forces suffered subsequent failures in their nation-
building efforts and the incident later known as 'Black Hawk Down' sealed the fate of 
the UN operation where local forces succeeded in shooting down helicopter gunships 
as they strafed the streets of Mogadishu. US President Bill Clinton was forced to 
announce that all US forces would quit Somalia, which led to other components of 
the  UNOSOM  announcing  their  departure  as  soon  as  they  could  (Lewis  2008), 
leaving Somalia in a still state of violence and anarchy (Menkhaus 2004). The UN’s 
attempt was the first attempt in a number of externally funded national reconciliation 
conferences in Somalia (Menkaus 2004; Lewis 2008; Møller 2009).  
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2.1.3 Since 1995
Since 1995, armed conflict  continues to plague much of Somalia,  but the nature, 
duration and intensity of warfare has changed significantly, with the armed conflicts 
today being more locally oriented with clashing sub-clans in the fragmented political 
environment (Menkhaus 2004; Møller 2009). Although Somalia still remains without 
a  functional  central  government,  slight  improvements  started  to  be  traced  in  its 
system  of  governance.  Local  polities,  generally  comprised  of  Shari'a  courts  or 
municipalities,  have  sprung up,  providing  some amount  of  law and order,  while 
businessmen, increasingly dissatisfied with the growing lawlessness,  created local 
police  forces  (Brons  2001;  Menkhaus  2007;  2008).  The  TNG  of  Somalia  was 
established in April-May 2000 at  the Somalia National Peace Conference held in 
Djibouti and was succeeded in 2004 by the TFG. We shall elaborate more on these 
attempts later.
Hence, Somalia has been characterised by the rise of informal systems of adaptation, 
security and governance in response to the prolonged absence of a functional central 
government. This development has been driven by the evolving role of coalitions of 
business groups, traditional authorities and civic groups in promoting the stateless 
forms  of  public  order  and rule  of  law.  The Somali  political,  civil  and economic 
culture has a behavior, where peace and local police systems are promoted while the 
revelation of  the state  is  undermined (Menkhaus 2006;  2007;  2008).  It  is  in  this 
intersection  between  Government  without  Governance,  and  Governance  without 
Government, that the focus of the rest of this paper lies.
2.2 The Somali People
Somalis share not only the legacy of a pastoralist lifestyle, but also the experience of 
a  century of colonial  rule (notably by the British,  Italian and French empires);  a 
common language,  a  common religion,  a  pervasive  political  culture  made  up of 
highly segmented lineage social order (Brons 2001: 94). Also, they share a rich oral 
literature with various styles that act as a powerful tool in influencing public opinion, 
political and social conflicts and groups’ coexistence (ibid.). These common cultural 
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roots  create  a strong sense of  ‘Somali  identity’.  Nevertheless the struggle is  still 
going on to transform this into a viable national identity.
In  Somalia,  the  various  identities  have  often  been  politicised  in  the  strive  for  a 
solution  to  national  unification.  In  current  paper,  two  roots  of  identities  will  be 
highlighted  as  a  necessity  in  order  to  better  understand  the  Somali  bottom-up 
governance presumptions that have been made, and to understand the background of 
the Islamic courts as well as the premises under which they were operating. The first 
root is religious and mythical, and the second root is stems from the clan system.
2.2.1 Religion
The  vast  majority  of  Somalis  are  Sunni Muslim7 (Brons  2001:  95),  almost 
exclusively from the Shafi'ite school (Brons 2001; Le Sage 2005). Hence the Somali 
society does not suffer from any big divides within its Islamic orientation. On the 
contrary, religion is considered one of the unifying factors within Somali society. It is 
popularly believed by Somalis that their ancestors descended from the household of 
the prophet Mohamed so that all Somalis belong to the same clan.The exact history 
of Islam's presence in Somalia of today remains however unknown, but is dated back 
to  successive  waves  of  Arab  emigration  and  conquest  between  the  7th and  13th 
centuries (Le Sage 2005).
In pre-colonial times religious leaders were important authorities, together with clan-
elders.  Although some responsibilities were different, there were also a number of 
tasks that were overlapping. The solution to this was to a great extent that Islam 
served as a complement to the clan structure, thus being one of the only factors that 
was shared across clans. This came to mean that Shari’a never became the primary 
source  of  law,  though  again,  some  elements  from Shari’a  got  implemented  into 
Somali customary law, Xeer (Besteman 1999; Menkhaus 2006; Lewis 1961).
This situation, with Islam being somehow coexistent yet minor to the clan structure, 
was  not  challenged  until  in  the  1970s  when  new  Islamic  movements  emerged, 
7 Approximately 99 % (Brons 2001:95)
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supposedly as a reaction to the military regime that started questioning the authority 
of Islam. Furthermore these incompatibilities resulted in Islamic activists migrating 
to Arab countries, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Here, many of them initiated 
movements  with  the  goal  of  challenging the  Somali  regime,  with  the  alternative 
proposal to make an Islamic state in Somalia. In general, Islam came to serve as a 
mean to live by through the civil war. The movements were not the only option; for 
example Islamic organisations opened up hundreds of Islamic schools, and, in the 
absence of strong authorities, Islamic leaders stepped in to mediate in conflicts.
Among the most prominent Islamic organisations that emerged in this period were 
al-Islah,  al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and  al-Tabliq.  They all  shared a  vision of 
bringing Islamic values into the life of all Somalis, however their means to get there 
differed  significantly.  Al-Islah  and  al-Tabliq  were  both  Sufist  moderate  groups, 
emphasising  the  need for  peaceful  reform.  On the  contrary,  the  AIAI,  a  Salafist 
movement  with  inspiration  from  Saudi  Arabia,  was  more  radical,  opting  for 
revolution and with violence as an integrated aspect.
Hence, it can be said that Islamic extremism emerged as a response to the repressive 
regime, getting a footing as well as new supporters during the civil war. In the era of 
state collapse, new Islamic institutions emerged, now being entirely free of control 
from a state. All fractions managed to align with the clan system in their firm believe, 
that their Islamic values could in fact be used in a revival of a Somali nationalism. 
Conseqently,  supporters  were  recruited  regardless  of  their  clannish  heritage 
(Abdullahi 2007: 200).
2.2.2 Clan structure
The clan system is considered one of the most distinctive features of Somali social 
organisation and polity.  According to Lewis, clanship refers to “corporate agnatic 
identity at all levels of political cleavage” (Lewis 1961: 4). Lewis emphasises, that 
Somali genealogy is not merely a question of  family tree and descent of a group, but 
in fact represents the social divisions of people into corporate political groups. The 
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Somali  clan  system has  two major  lineages:  The  Samale clan has  traditionally a 
nomadic culture while the  Sab clan is  historically a  farming culture.  The Somali 
region as a socio-political and socio-economic unit - where the clan territories are 
units  of  social  organisation  in  their  own  right,  geographically  and  historically  - 
derives from customary pasture and water rights.
The  Somali  people  as  a  whole  has  been,  and  are  continuously,  separated  by 
international  state  borders.  Before independence  Somalis  were located in  British, 
French and Italian colonial states and in Ethiopia, and after independence in Somalia, 
Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia. Somali clans original distribution of territory has and 
is  continuously  under  transformation.  However,  in   the  contemporary  political 
landscape,  clans do  still  claim specific territories which refer back to traditional 
rights of access and control (Brons 2001:101). The main point to draw from this 
section is that clan territories and identity existed long before the emergence of state 
borders.  Furthermore,  according  to  Markakis  (1987),  the  existence  and  political 
meaning  of  the  state  borders,  was  recognised  by  the  clans  and  sub-clans  at  a 
relatively late stage in Somalia.
2.2.3 Xeer
The mixed Somali identity is to a great extent reflected in the judicial system within 
Somalia. At its independence and unification in 1960, four different legal traditions 
were  in  simultaneous  operation,  respectively;  British  Common  Law,  Italian 
(Continental) Law, Islamic Shari'a and Somali customary law, Xeer.
Xeer is a set of traditional social contracts, developed between Somalia's traditional 
elders to mediate peaceful relations between Somalia's clans and sub-clans. It relies 
on certain principles that are perceived as the most fundamental with unquestionable 
immutability. These are referred to as xissi adkaaday   and includes obligations on 
collective payment of  diya, maintenance of inter-clan harmony, family obligations, 
and on resource utilisation (Le Sage 2005: 32-33).8 Xeer in Somalia precede both the 
8 xissi adkaaday is comparable to jus cogens in international law, meaning; a fundamental principle 
of international law which is accepted by the international community of states as a norm from 
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colonial era, and is still widely used. In Somalia, we have also seen an emergence of 
ad hoc mechanisms, and a retort to Shari'a courts which is linked to the collapse of 
state structures and diverges from the traditional role of Shari'a in the local justice 
system.
2.3 Part Conclusion
Since 1991 Somalia has suffered from the lack of a central state and has therefore 
been suffering from different conflicts within clan lines, the rise of warlords and a 
lack of a common domestic legitimate authority. Somalia, however, has also  been 
characterised by the rise of informal systems of adaptation, security, and governance 
in response to the prolonged absence of a functional central government. The Somali 
society is inherently a decentralised one, relying on clan structures as the basis for 
organisation  in  society.  The  one  unifying  element  has  throughout  all  times  been 
Islam. Having primarily served as a subordinate element to Xeer and the decision 
structures of the clans, Islam really found its footing during and after the civil war, 
resulting in different Islamic organisations.
3 THE SOVEREIGN STATE AS AN ORGANISATION FOR 
POLITICAL ORDER
The Peace of Westphalia  in 1648 is  the major historical  event,  creating what we 
today know as nation states. The agreements and conceptions of sovereign statehood 
stemming from this event have changed very little to the present day (Krasner 1999). 
Following centuries  of  centralisation  and decentralisation,  of  war  and peace,  this 
peace  treaty  formally  drew  the  European  map,  established  the  rule  of  non 
intervention  and  the  need  and  right  to  uphold  sovereignty  within  a  defined 
geographical entity (Simpson 2008). On the contrary the post-colonial states never 
had to fight for their territory in the name of statehood and therefore, never had to 
prove their internal sovereignty to the international society.
which no derogation is ever permitted.
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This has left a fundamental gap between the informal diverse local authorities and 
the  formal  structures  of  the  state  initiated  by  the  former  colonial  rulers  and 
maintained by the international society.  The baseline of this chapter is therefore to 
assess  state  theories,  particularly  those  addressing  states,  that  falls  outside  the 
normative framework, or what is often referred to as 'failed states'. From there we 
shall look into whether Somalia can appropriately be described as a failed state, and 
at last, we will account for four main approaches to dealing with these states.
3.1 The Nation-State
Classical conceptions of the state dates back to Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century. 
Hobbes understood human beings and their nature as being ultimately chaotic – units 
that instinctively regards one another as enemies, in a state of chaotic anarchy. The 
state becomes a leviathan to the citizens creating a fear or understanding of the state, 
establishing an amount of order in society. Or said in another way, the state is a social 
contract  between  state  and  citizens,  where  individuals  voluntarily  give  up  some 
amount of freedom in exchange for guaranteed peace and security (Simpson 2008; 
John 2008).
In current studies of the state, scholars most often draw reference to Max Weber 
when outlining the primary functions  of  statehood.  Weber  draws attention to  the 
aspect of legitimacy, both from within and from outside the state's territory. When the 
European states recognised each other after  1648, they created legitimacy for the 
respective borderlines,  while  legitimisation from within the state  comes from the 
citizen’s recognition. Weber's particular emphasis is, however, on the monopoly of 
violence, where a state is defined as:”a human community that (successfully) claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” even 
when  ”the  right  to  used  physical  force  is  ascribed  to  other  institutions  or  to 
individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it” (Weber et al. 1991: 78). 
The  sociological  understanding  of  the  state  and  the  emphasis  on  violence  in  its 
function, is also underlined by Niccolô Machiavelli, emphasising the use of force, 
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and force alone, as the fundamental element of statehood (John 2008; Salmon 2008). 
Weber,  in  continuation  of  Hobbes,  furthermore  points  to  the  interdependency 
between  the  state  and  its  citizens;  the  state  holds  the  monopoly  of  (legitimate) 
violence,  administers collection of taxes,  and in return provides the citizens with 
certain benefits such as security, stability, infrastructure and facilitation of economy 
(Leftwich 2008). Scholars, however, differ in what elements they believe that a state 
should be providing, some focusing primarily on the absolute minimum, that is, that 
the  state  should  provide  order  and  security,  whereas  others  have  a  broader 
understandings,  including for  example  the  esurance  of  basic  human rights  and a 
number  of  public  goods.  This  also  means  that,  when  studying  statehood,  some 
scholars focus on legitimacy,  whereas other focuses on territorial  borders (Herbst 
1996; 2000), and still others look more into administrative capacities (Call 2008).
3.2 The Failed State
The first analysts to use the term failed state, and gain widespread acceptance for 
their definition, were Helman and Rathner in their article 'Saving failed states' from 
1993.  Here  they  characterise  the  failed  state  as  'a  disturbing  new  phenomenon' 
whereby a state is becoming „utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the 
international community“ (Helman & Rathner 1993: 3-20).
According to Robert I. Rotberg state failure can happen in different dimensions such 
as security, economic development, political representation and income distribution 
(Rotberg 2002:  85).  He argues that nation states fail  because they can no longer 
deliver positive political  goods to  their  people.  Therefore,  their  governments lose 
legitimacy and in the growing plurality of its citizens, the nation-state itself becomes 
illegitimate.  Rotberg argues that 'failed'  or 'collapsed',  is  the end stage of failure, 
which  in  extreme  cases  such  as  in  Somalia,  can  happen  on  all  dimensions 
simultaneously.
“A collapsed state is a rare and extreme version of a failed state. 
Political  goods  are  obtained  through  private  or  ad  hoc  means. 
Security is equated with the rule of the strong. A collapsed state 
exhibits  a  vacuum  of  authority.  It  is  a  mere  geographical 
Global Studies K1
Spring 2010 27
Failed Approaches to a Failed State – Somalia and the Union of Islamic Courts
expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen. There 
is  dark energy,  but the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the 
radiance that hitherto provided some semblance of order and other 
vital  political  goods  to  the  inhabitants  (no  longer  the  citizens) 
embraced  by language  or  ethnic  affinities  or  borders”  (Rotberg 
2004: 9-10)
In more cases there is, however, a wide variation in the extent to which a state 'fails'  
across different dimensions, although the persistence of political violence is salient in 
most definitions, characterising failed states as marked by tension, deep conflict, and 
by that they are dangerous and bitterly contested by warring factions (Rotberg 2002: 
Rotberg 2003). Another indicator of failed states is their inability to control their 
borders, losing authority over parts over their territory.  The execution of political 
power is often limited to the capital city and one or more ethnically specific zones. 
Therefore, one important measure of the extent of a state failure is how much of the 
state's geographical expanse a government genuinely controls.
Another  acknowledged  definition  is  that  by  Zartman  who  emphasises  that  state 
collapse does not happen on a day-to-day basis, but rather is a long term process. He 
defines state collapse as follows:
“State collapse is a deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup, 
or  riot.  It  refers  to  a  situation  where  the  structure,  authority 
(legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and 
must be reconstituted in some form, old or new. On the other hand, 
it is not necessarily anarchy. Nor is it simply a byproduct of the 
rise of ethnic nationalism: it is the collapse of old orders, notably 
the state that brings about the retreat to ethnic nationalism as the 
residual, viable identity” (Zartman 1995:1).
Hence, according to Zartman, a state collapse is the breakdown of old orders, without 
leaving the country in complete anarchy.
Francis Fukuyama (2004a) offers a classification of statehood. He divides the state's 
functions into certain variables, one being the scope of state activities, referring to 
the range of the state’s public goods and services and the state's regulatory purview, 
and the second being the strength of state power. The strength of state power can be 
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traced back to Weber’s definition of a state; with the most essential capability of the 
state being its ability of enforcement; “the ability, ultimately, to send someone with a 
uniform and a gun, to force people to comply with a state’s laws”(Kraxberger 2007: 
5). Hence the strength – or the lack - of the state's power should be measured from 
the capabilities of bureaucracies, courts and governments to deliver on their promises 
and to enforce laws and rules.  
The Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics (Crisis States 
Workshop, London, March 2006) makes a distinction between three terms that are 
commonly – and according to them – wrongly mixed up; the fragile state, the crisis 
state and the failed state. According to them, a fragile state is a state significantly 
susceptible to crisis in one or more of its sub-systems. It is particularly vulnerable to 
internal and external shocks and domestic and international conflicts. A  crisis state, 
on the other hand, is a state under acute stress - where reigning institutions face 
serious contestation and are potentially unable to manage conflicts and shocks (there 
is a risk of state collapse), while the failed state is in the actual condition of state 
collapse.  It  can  be  a  state  that  no  longer  performs  its  basic  security  tasks  and 
development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. 
Therefore; a failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the conditions for its 
own existence.
Rotberg (2004) introduces the idea that it is possible to rank state failures according 
to the dimensions in which a state fails to deliver positive goods. Nation-states exist 
to  deliver  political  goods  -  security,  education,  health,  economic  opportunity, 
environmental  surveillance,  making  and  enforcing  an  institutional  framework, 
providing and maintaining infrastructure, and, in order to rank the severity of a state 
failure, he suggests that there exists something as a hierarchy of these positive state 
functions,  which  are  respectively:  1)  Security,  2)  institutions  to  regulate  and 
adjudicate conflicts; rule of law, secure property rights and contract enforcements; 3) 
political participation; and 4) social service delivery, infrastructure and regulation of 
the  economy.  Rotberg's  main  idea  is,  that  not  any  single  indicator  provides  the 
evidence that a state is becoming weaker, or that a weak state is starting to fail and 
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therefore; that the indicators must necessarily be taken together.
3.2.1 Somalia as a Failed State
The theory on failed states as presented above, leaves us with certain questions that 
we must decide on in order to discuss the validity of the concept of the failed state, in 
relation  to  Somalia.  The  characteristics  of  the  failed  state,  understood  as  the 
breakdown of the state apparatus as service deliverer as presented above - and only 
in this sense - seems to be applicable to Somalia in every sense, if the state is to be 
understood as the recognised domestic institutions from the international community. 
However, if the term state failure implies a complete break-down of the existence of 
all the societal structures presented above, it does not seem applicable to describe the 
Somali reality.
Overall,  the  Somali  state  as  from  1991  is  a  state  that  no  longer  produces  the 
conditions for its own existence. The state has a lack of monopoly on violence, and 
the secession of Somaliland and the creation of the federal state of Puntland, further 
underlines the sovereign state's non existing control and authority within the territory. 
Nonetheless, this must this must not be aligned with the complete break-down of 
societal structures and services. Only, the central state does not deliver it.
Perhaps  more  than  anything,  Somalia  fits  into  the  collapsed  state  definition  put 
forward by among others Zartmann (1995), where the breakdown of  old systems 
does not equal to complete anarchy. As a response to the state collapse, the post 1991 
Somali society has developed its own mechanisms for providing basic public goods, 
first  and foremost  security and rule  of  law.  Although the capacity of  these local 
systems  is  somehow  unstable  and  varies  with  internal  and  external  shocks,  the 
Somali  society  is  said  to  have  been  generally  safer  in  the  periods  where  these 
systems have been in power.  In other words, these systems provide some sort  of 
stability, or what by some scholars is referred to as Governance without Government 
(Menkhaus 2007; 2008; Møller 2009), and therefore, the Somali territory cannot be 
characterised as a complete anarchy. When engaging in Somalia, these local informal 
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justice systems cannot simply be disregarded: They exist,  they are used and they 
have a much greater degree of legitimacy than externally imposed state initiatives 
have been able to claim. Whether they are used because no other mechanism exists, 
or because they are a true reflection of acceptance from the population is not relevant 
as long as there is no alternative.
Moreover,  drawing  on  John  (2008)  the  terms  'state  failure'  and  'failed  state'  are 
inappropriate since "they imply that there is an 'end state' in which the 'failure' arrives 
in final form". Dorff (2000) suggests a process of failing. This reflects the fact, that 
failure must be understood in its historical context, and that it is misleading to define 
an entity as a 'failed state' in a context where state formation never really happened in 
the first place. Thus, the past 20 years in Somalia should be understood as a step in a 
process of defining and settling on an appropriate organisation to ensure political 
order  that reflects  the structures  and the reality of the Somali  society.  Verhoeven 
describes this process to failed states, which he labels ‘creative destruction’:
“’Creative destruction’ sees  state  weakness  or  collapse  not  as  a 
(temporary) failure of a political entity on its teleological path to 
full statehood, but rather as a more open set of processes that could 
lead to state  formation,  but  also to  something else” (Verhoeven 
2009: 418).
How  the  failed  state  is  perceived  and  categorized,  is  not  merely  a  theoretical 
classification, but the point of departure for those initiatives that are taken towards 
the country's development of institutional capacities, as shall be presented below. In 
the following section, we shall look into different frameworks on how to address a 
failed  state  (Kraxberger  2007).  The  tendency  between  the  dominant  of  these 
frameworks, is that they are based on the assumption, that the sovereign nation-state 
is the right solution for all parts of the world. From this assumption follows, that if a 
state  has  failed,  it  should be  rebuild;  thus  the  widely used term ‘state  building’, 
defined  by Barnett  Rubin  as  “The  interrelated  establishment  and stabilization  of 
control of the means of violence and authority, combined with the mobilization of 
resources to sustain these institutions…” (Rubin 2008: 30-31).
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3.3 Responses to the Failed State
As mentioned in the introduction, there have been  numerous attempts to do either 
state  or  peace building  in  Somalia  from 1991 till  today (Brons 2001;  Menkhaus 
2004;  2007;  2009;  Møller  2009;  Verhoeven  2009).  The  reason  for  the  repeated 
attempts is that they have all failed; if they had succeeded there would not be a need 
for repetition. The international community's response to Somalia is build upon the 
'Revival  and  Reconstructing'  strategy,  which  has  been  the  dominant  approach  to 
failed  states  through  times,  and  represents  the  aforementioned  assumption,  that 
modern territorial states are the only and right organisation for all. The implications 
of this strategy are that this firm structural form is the target, even in instances where 
states, in reality, never had the capacity and legitimacy to control their territory. The 
outcome of this strategy can particularly be traced to the post colonial period, where 
the recognition of states was more a non-critical fabric procedure of classification of 
artificially drawn territories, rather than an actual evaluation of the social dynamics 
and structures and their realistic opportunities for organisation (Kraxberger 2007). 
This  seems paradoxical  especially  compared to  the  situation  nowadays,  where  it 
seems to  be  hard to  gain  recognition  for  potential  new states  as  well  as  to  lose 
recognition as a state, even when it is dysfunctional (Herbst 2000; Kraxberger 2007). 
When looking primarily at juridical sovereignty instead of empirical, it reveals the 
assumption that all the states will become self-sustaining; the idea of national self-
determination. The approaches on how to deal with the dysfunctional state therefore 
builds  upon  the  perception  that  the  recovery  is  a  technical  exercise  that  can  be 
refined and perfected (Kraxberger 2007). It is implicit in this approach, that there is 
no question as to whether the dysfunctional state should be rebuild and 'fixed'; the 
goal is inevitably statehood. The debate within this school is in more technical terms 
what the right approach is to actual succeed in the process of ‘fixing’. Some are 
emphasising  that  security  should  be  established  before  building  democratic 
institutions, while others stress the need for both to be implemented simultaniously 
(Fukuyama 2004a).
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'Shared  sovereignty’ as  proposed  by among  others,  Krasner  and  Fukuyama,  and 
implemented  in  for  example  Kosovo,  is  a  newer  approach  to  failed  states.  This 
approach follows a recent theoretical trend, where the priority of self determination 
over  statehood  is  being  questioned,  although  the  proponents  still  believe  in  the 
desirability of the Westphalian State. Their main point is, that the establishment of 
effective governance is the right way forward, and that this can be achieved through 
shared governance. The approach therefore calls for long term commitment or “quasi 
permanent” presence from the international community in the given country.  The 
period should be case specific, but it would mean decades of presence and not only 
years, which naturally comes to mean that the international community present, must 
have vital interests in the stability of the country. The approach emphasises the need 
for “institutional creativity”, meaning that decision making should be shared between 
domestic and international actors on a voluntary and mutually agreed basis.  This 
obviously implies  that  the  local  government  has  to  give  up  their  sovereignty on 
certain issues (Krasner 1999; Kraxberger 2007; Fukuyama 2004a).
A third  approach  main  approach  to  addressing  failed  states,  'Stateless  zones',  is 
perhaps  the  most  radically  different  from  the  main  assumptions  of  the  two 
approaches presented above. The scholars arguing for this approach points out the 
need of a historically based analysis  in order to emphasise the point that modern 
statehood is a failed project on a global scale. According to Christopher Clapham:
“The analysis of international relations [. . .] now needs to come to 
terms with the reemergence of a once familiar kind of global order, 
in which zones of  statehood have to coexist  with zones of less 
settled governance. We need to work out the ways in which this 
coexistence  is  likely to  operate  best.  The  alternative  project  of 
attempting to restore universal statehood is chimerical” (Clapham 
2004:78)
Clapham  (1998)  thus  introduces  the  concept  of  relative  statehood.  Drawing  on 
Robert Jacksons distinction between positive and negative sovereignty9 he points out, 
9  Positive sovereignty refers to states that enjoy recognition from the international society and are  
capable of controlling their territory domestically, whereas negative sovereignty describes what is 
known as ‘quasi – states’; states that do enjoy international recognition in spite of their reduced or 
lacking ability to control their territory domestically.    
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that  the  international  recognition  of  the  post  colonial  quasi  states  has  led  to  an 
artificial upholding; instead of being supported by the population within the country, 
many of these quasi states have been kept alive by drawing on support from the 
international system. On this background Clapham puts into question the idea that 
statehood  is  a  necessary  prerequisite  for  a  functional  country:  “Even  though  a 
number of states have done massive damage to their people, there has been little in 
the experience of failed states to cast doubt on the proposition that statehood remains 
an essential  prerequisite  for  order,  representation and the improvement  of human 
welfare  within  the  present  international  order”  (Clapham  1998:  157).  Drawing 
primarily on historical data from Africa, Clapham concludes that although some sort 
of governance is desired in most regions, statehood should not be perceived to be the 
only  option  to  achieve  this.  Rather,  statehood  is  a  relative  concept.  Instead  of 
distinguishing between entities that are, and are not states, we should regard different 
entities as meeting the criteria  for statehood to greater  or lesser extends.  Entities 
usually  perceived  as  states,  often  fail  to  meet  them  minimum  responsibilities 
associated with state power, while  entities that are not accorded the status of ‘states’, 
may take on attributes that is  usually associated with sovereign statehood (ibid.), 
such as it can be argued is the case with the UIC.
The fourth main approach, 'Territorial restructuring', argues for the recognition of de 
facto  sovereignty  and  the  restructuring  of  de jure international  boundaries  when 
necessary. In other words; if a state has proved not to be empirically sovereign there 
is no reason to uphold its juridical sovereignty, and visa versa; if a territory that is not 
recognized by the international society proves to be empirically sovereign, like is the 
case  with  Somaliland according to  several  authors,  then  the  international  society 
should be ready to re-draw borders (Herbst 2000; Kraxberger 2007).
3.4 Part Conclusion
The Peace of Westphalia was historic because this peace treaty settled that the world 
would  consist  of  Sovereign  states.  However,  these  states  came  to  differ  widely 
between the Western and the post-colonial world. In the West the states were a result 
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of centuries and centuries of battles, whereas the post-colonial states were a result of 
artificially  drawn  borders.  Sovereign  states  from  the  Western  understanding  of 
statehood have certain responsibilities that they should be upholding; if  they stop 
upholding even the most basic of these functions, they get classified as ‘failed’ or 
‘collapsed’ states. The term ‘failed state’ has been used widely to describe Somalia, 
and it does fit to the extent, that the state apparatus broke down in 1991, and has not 
been functioning since then. However, at the same time the term seem inappropriate 
in describing Somalia, in that it first of all implies that a functioning state in Somalia 
has  existed  before  it  broke  down,  which  is  only  an  approximation  of  the  truth. 
Secondly, the label indicates that a failed state is an end station and hence, it does not 
account for the new structures that emerge in the lack of the state. As this is not 
noted, there is only one way back – to rebuild the former state - even though it has 
proved dysfunctional in its context. These are the assumptions that are reflected in 
the dominant approach to state building – the revival and reconstruction school.
3.5 An Approach for Somalia
In the following part we will look into each of the four approaches as presented in 
part 3.2.2. to see and discuss, what seems to be the most viable road to take when a 
approaching Somalia, in studies as well as in practice.
3.5.1 Revival and Reconstruction
As  mentioned,  the  approach  dominating  state-  and  peace  building  attempts  in 
Somalia,  has been that of the revival  and reconstruction school.  The Transitional 
National  and  the  Transitional  Federal  Governments  that  have  been  installed  in 
Somalia since 2000, represent striking examples of this strategy. In the following part 
we shall be focusing on the example of the TFG.
When the mandate of the TNG ran out in 2004 a new government was constituted. 
The  TFG  was  the  result  of  negotiations  facilitated  by  the  Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD)10 that had been running in Kenya since 2002. The 
10 A regional organisation in the Horn of Africa. Members count Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibuti, 
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country  was  to  have  an  independent  judiciary,  an  obligation  to  comply  with 
international law and honour the various civic rights set out in the charter put forth 
(Møller 2009).
Although  the  negotiations  were  characterised  by  attempts  to  make  the  outcome 
acceptable  for  as  many  interests  in  the  Somali  society  as  possible,  the  process 
became  one  with  a  massive  focus  on,  and  disagreements  about,  power  sharing 
instead of problem solving. It has been suggested that although the attempt was to 
invite all interests from the Somali society, this was by far not accomplished (Krath 
05.16.10).  On top of this the Somaliland government refused to participate in the 
negotiations, and it  was not possible to find a common ground within the IGAD 
members that first initiated the process. It all meant that the negotiations were almost 
given up on several occasions. By 2004, however, the IGAD members managed to 
put enough unified pressure on the Somali delegates, and this eventually led to the 
agreement about the creation of the TFI including a Transitional Federal Parliament, 
a Transitional Federal President and a TFG. Nevertheless, the TFG never actually 
became effective. The parliament empowered to appoint the rest of the TFI was not 
actually elected, but appointed by the various clans, and while a number of clans 
were included in this agreement, others remained excluded (Menkhaus 2009; Møller 
2009). That the new government knew that they failed to represent domestic interests 
is  among other  things  reflected  in  the  fact  they never  actually  settled  physically 
inside  Somalia,  and  when  they  did,  they  hardly  controlled  the  street  where  the 
government  building  were  located.  Bjørn  Møller  labels  their  influence  as 
“government without governance” as opposed to the influence that the UIC exerted 
(Møller 2009:17-18) and The International Crisis Group concluded the following on 
the  international  involvement  in  Somalia  generally,  and  specifically,  on  the 
installment and perpetuation of the TFG:
“The  international  response  [to  Somalia]  has  been  inadequate. 
Instead of engaging meaningfully and forcefully in the search for a 
political solution, including with such regional actors as Ethiopia, 
Eritrea  and  Saudi  Arabia,  major  outside  actors  have  hurt  the 
process  (the  U.S.)  or  sought  vainly  to  prop  up  the  TFG  (the 
Europeans) and are now willing to support its extension, despite its 
Kenya, Uganda and Somalia.
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disastrous  record,  while  concentrating  on  the  piracy  issue  to 
protect their own commercial interests” (International Crisis Group 
12.23.2008)
Although the TFG managed to get some kind of influence in 2007, it was only due to 
massive support from Ethiopian troops, that they were finally installed in Mogadishu, 
and they lost  their  power soon after  the troops were withdrawn (Krath 05.16.10; 
Lewis 2008). Nonetheless, as indicated in the above quote from the International 
Crisis Group, their mandate was yet again renewed in 2008, and remains recognised 
from the eyes oft he international community as is today, irrespective of their lacking 
de facto capabilities (Møller 03.12.10).
3.5.2 Shared Sovereignty
Although  the  dominant  approach  to  dealing  with  failed  states,  the  revival  and 
reconstruction school, as exemplified, has failed miserably in the Somali context, the 
three remaining schools has not yet been considered as serious options. The shared 
sovereignty  approach,  however,  seems  to  be  unrealistic  in  that  it,  as  mentioned 
above, would require long term commitment from international actors. This does not 
appear to be an option; Western countries, led by the US, seems to be caught in a 
dilemma;  on  one  hand they may have  a  major  interest  in  getting  the  prospering 
security threat  that  Somalia  represents  under  control.  On the other  hand,  the  US 
politicians might not be willing to invest the resources required in such a project, as 
that would not be beneficiary for them domestically, due to the losses of US soldiers 
during the Black Hawk Down incident, in combination with recent events in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
Even if  it  turned out that the international society would be willing to invest the 
resources and the time needed it would most likely not be working. First of all, the 
Somali contribution to this shared sovereignty would probably not be representative 
of  the  Somali  society;  both  the  TNG  and  the  TFG  were  attempts  to  create 
representative governments, yet still, this was not accomplished. Secondly, there is 
little chance that the Somali people will find actors from the international society 
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legitimate,  as  a  consequence  of  the  mistrust  that  has  arisen  with  all  the  failed 
interventions.
3.5.3 Stateless Zones
With the dismissal of the 'revival and reconstruction'  and the 'shared sovereignty' 
schools as being viable approaches in a Somali context, we shall now turn to the 
more alternative recommendation of ‘stateless zones’.
Inspired  by Clapham,  we shall  introduce  the  UIC as  a  potential  alternative  to  a 
sovereign  in  Somalia,  as  they were  among  the  most  prominent  actors  in  South-
Central Somalia after the collapse of the Barre regime (Shay 2008: 93). The first 
Islamic  court  was  already  established  in  1993  in  Mogadishu,  but  as  from 1997 
several other courts started appearing in and around Mogadishu (ibid.).  The main 
idea behind each of these emerging courts was to bring clans and sub clans in a given 
area together, organised around one united court (ibid.: 95). At very first the courts 
appeared  on  a  rather  non-coordinated  level,  but  in  2004  ten  of  the  courts  in 
Mogadishu gathered in a new umbrella organisation, The Supreme Council of UIC in 
Somalia, known and hereafter referred to as the Shura. The Shura was led by elected 
chairman, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. In 2006 it came to serious clashes between 
the UIC and Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPC) 
together  with  the  US  backed  warlords  that  had  been  somewhat  in  control  of 
Mogadishu until  then.  The clashes came to an end in  June 2006,  when the UIC 
declared their victory in the control of Mogadishu. Following, they also took over the 
power of Jowhar, Baladwayne, Haradere, Kismayo and Brava. The takeovers were 
mainly effectuated through battles with local warlords or TFG sympathisers, while at 
the same time, the civil society was usually welcoming the UIC (ibid.). This might 
have been due to the fact, that the UIC was perceived as something stemming from 
the  Somali  society  itself,  thus  contrary  to  the  several  externally  initiated  state 
building  attempts.  Also,  their  Islamic  trademark  was  an  advantage,  in  that  as 
mentioned earlier, this is one of the only unifying elements across clans of Somalia. 
Lastly, they were welcomed, as they not only managed to provide a certain level of 
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security for the first time since before the civil war, but also provided a number of 
other public goods. Hence, throughout the second half of 2006, political Islam was 
the primary governing structure for most of Somalia, with the only area remaining 
explicitly secular was the west, where the weak TFG controlled the town of Baidoa 
(Menkhaus 2007; Shay 2008; Ahmed 2007).
The history of the UIC, together with their accomplishments and hence, their support 
from the population, seems to encapsulate what Menkhaus describe as follows:
“Somalis, like everybody else, have agency – they act. They are 
not passive victims. They act to provide some sort of security and 
law and order for themselves” (Menkhaus 2009: ~21min)
Furthermore,  this  is  an  indication  of  what  Zartman  among  others  slightly 
acknowledges; that state collapse does not end with absolute anarchy per se. William 
Reno takes it a step further in stating that “Left to themselves, collapsed states may 
“fix themselves”, but with outcomes that supersede old frontiers and that are based 
upon  the  formation  of  new  political  communities”  (Reno  2008:  146).  More 
specifically; the UIC proves, that in spite of the fact that state collapse equals the 
breakdown of the old systems, typically state institutions, security and other public 
goods are often delivered by other actors (ibid.: 143).
The underlying imperative is that the state is only one out of many alternative public 
good providing organisations:
”Whether a state can be considered a sovereign political authority 
ultimately  depends  on  whether  the  people  –  the  citizens  living 
within a defined territory – accept and respect domination by this 
authority  that  is  whether  there  is  de  facto  sovereignty.”  (Brons 
2001: 245).
Hence,  the  UIC  seems  to  be  in  line  with  Clapham’s  recommendations  of 
acknowledging alternatives for the sovereign state, amongst those actors that actually 
take on a number of the state functions.
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3.5.4 Territorial Restructuring
The trouble with the above conclusion arises when it becomes clear, that this should 
be  combined  with  the  territorial  restructuring  and  international  recognition  as 
recommended by Jeffrey Herbst, in order to be included in the current world order. 
One would  be tempted to  state,  that  if  an  entity in  an era  of  state  collapse was 
actually  able  to  take  on  some  of  the  most  crucial  state  functions,  then  the 
international  soceity  should  not  hesitate  in  recognising  this  entity  as  the  new 
sovereign within the territory ruled.
More specifically, the example of Somaliland has for example led scholars to discuss 
alternatives to the old 'failed' political order. Herbst criticises the intellectual triumph 
of the nation state, pointing to the argument that the main criteria for any nation state 
is  that  it  should  be  able  to  control  the  territory  it  possesses  (Herbst  2000).  In 
particular the UN, he argues, has since 1945 been a ‘decolonisation machine’ with its 
primary purpose  to  proclaim that  every country is  able  to  rule  itself  as  soon as 
possible, and to keep insisting on that claim regardless of the facts on the ground 
(ibid.: 257). For example, all though it was obvious to all concerned that the Somali 
state had collapsed by December 1992 when the UN/US led intervention force was 
being  planned,  no  one  seriously  considered  trusteeship  or  other  legal  concepts, 
besides continuing the fiction that Somalia was still a sovereign nation-state (Herbst 
2000: 258). Herbst’s critique of the international society is consequently that while 
most are trying to rediscover methods to put failed states back together, few ask if it 
would be better to try to redesign at least some African states. No alternative to the 
nation-state will be forced upon Africa, and most reports addressing the problems 
still use the existing nation-states as their unit of analysis.
A departure from this acceptance of the theoretical, or juridical, sovereignty would 
thus be a signal that something has gone fundamentally wrong in Somalia and a 
break with the myth that every state is always exercising control. Returning to the 
concept of governance without government, Herbst emphasises an important area to 
explore; that is the diminishing control that some African governments exercise over 
distance, as it is the case with the TFG in Somalia. In areas far from the capital, 
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where  other  actors  have  moved  into  the  vacuum created  by  state  collapse,  it  is 
necessary to realise that the rural communities are facing a situation where authority 
is  exercised by other means than by that of the state.  This in itself  should entail 
abandoning the fictions of some parts of international norms, apparent in for example 
international law (Herbst 1996; Shaw 2009; Haines 2008).
Within the old Somali  territory Somaliland as well  as Puntland could be used as 
examples on what would happen if some African states were reordered around some 
organisation other than the sovereign state. Characterising for both of these territories 
is  that they have reached a degree of stability that South-Central  Somalia cannot 
claim to possess.
3.5.5 Considering the Approaches
Although bottom-up governance structures are acknowledged by some scholars, it 
still seems to be without effect on the common strategies on how to approach failed 
states,  where  the  goal  remains  to  get  the  previous  state  back  on  track.  In  this 
argument lies the implicit assumption, that nation-states are the only organisational 
option in the world order.
According to Rubin (2008) the outspoken goal of the international society, stressing 
the need for rebuilding states that are initially dysfunctional, must be understood as a 
response to the troubles with maintaining security in  the post-Westphalian global 
system, that is juridical as well as politically organised around the concept of state 
sovereignty. Although this goal can be legitimised by referring to it as an aim to build 
national  capacity  and  by  labelling  the  operations  as  “peace  building”  or 
“stabilisation”,  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  it  is  still  the  way through  which 
powerful Western states exercise their influence, as the world after 2001 has realised 
that even the weakest states are posing a threat towards the Western world (Rubin 
2008: 26-27).
Therefore, from this perspective, the only option is for failed states to be rebuild, 
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even where the previous state structure most obviously was dysfunctional. This is so, 
even though it is apparent that alternative ways of governance, most significantly 
embodied by the UIC, are emerging. And it is so, even though the roots of these 
alternative structures can be traced back to a significantly earlier period in the history 
of Somalia than the state; Somalia can actually be said to have been relatively well 
equipped to cope with state  collapse in  the sense that  the primary local  security 
systems, that emerged after 1991, were based on traditional mechanisms, such as 
Xeer,  diya and  the  clan  structure  that  is  the  foundation  of  the  Somali  society 
(Menkhaus 2007: 69).
Inspired by Clapham we argue, that non-state actors like the UIC could actually hold 
a legitimate monopoly of violence within the territory. Apparently, the UIC provides 
some level of  security for the Somali citizens, that leads one to notice that security is 
not necessarily a result of the existence of a functioning central state. A state might as 
well make a country more unstable as was argued earlier with the TFG.
Rubin argues,  that  all  international  interventions have political  objectives  that  go 
beyond building states, and that the success of the interventions is highly dependent 
upon the legitimacy that can be obtained from the international society as well as 
from the citizens of a given country (Rubin 2008: 25-26). This is exactly where the 
trouble begins. The common use of the marker ‘failed state’ seems to be misleading 
when wanting to make an efficient approach to Somalia, as it does not account for 
the emerging governance structures, with broad public support, such as the UIC.
Although the UIC managed to be acknowledged by domestic society by the end of 
2006, the evaluation from the international society was slightly different from that of 
the Somali population. The result was the Ethiopian intervention and defeat of the 
UIC.
3.6 Part Conclusion
In the above we have discussed four different approaches that could be applied when 
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dealing with Somalia. The dominant approach, ‘revival and reconstruction’ has been 
applied,  however  it  has  not  worked  efficiently  as  it  has  neglected  the  special 
dynamics in the Somali society into consideration. ‘Shared sovereignty’ is based on 
the same assumptions of the state as that of the revival and reconstruction school, but 
has not been applied in a Somali context. Partly due to these assumptions and partly 
due to the domestic and international interests that is a consequence of the failed 
restoration attempts so far, this approach is not considered as viable.
Thus,  we have turned to  the recommendation proposed by Clapham of ‘stateless 
zones’. This approach differs from the above, in that it recognises that other actors 
than the conventional state can provide governance in the absence of the state, which 
seems to be exactly what the UIC did in the context of the Somali state collapse. The 
fourth  approach ‘territorial  restructuring’ put  forward  by Herbst,  has  its  point  of 
departure in a severe critique of the international society.  He claims that it fails to act 
on dysfunctional  states  and recognise potential  new governance structures  within 
specific territories, thus sometimes resulting in incongruence between domestic and 
international perceptions and interests.
4 THE UIC AS AN ASPIRING LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 
DOMESTICALLY
We shall now turn to an analysis and discussion of these examples of interacting and 
contradicting governance functions that has been upheld by the UIC in the era of 
‘state collapse’, most significanlyt in the second half of 2006. First however, we shall 
specify our theoretical framework within this context.
4.1 Framework: Governance, Sovereignty and Legitimate Authority
In order to formulate our framework we shall start by listing up the conclusions that 
we have induced from the chapters above. Following this, we shall be looking more 
into the concept of sovereignty, to decide on what is important for governace. Finally, 
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we shall outline our approach for the domestic analysis.
4.1.1 Point of Departure
As induced from the previous chapters, the framework for the domestic analysis of 
the  UIC  as  an  aspiring  alternative  to  the  sovereign  state,  takes  the  following 
conclusions as point of departure:
4.1.2 Legitimate Authority Domestically
In order to answer if the UIC managed to provide governance, and thus were an 
alternative to the state in the conventional sense, we must get more specific on which 
qualities that are essential in order to be a sovereign.
Classical  perceptions  of  sovereignty  as  understood  by  Jean  Bodin  and  Thomas 
Hobbes served as the baseline for the Westphalian system, in theory and in practice 
(Slomp 2000: 34-37). Within International Relations the concept of sovereignty is in 
line with the realist paradigm, in that the world order is structured around territorial, 
mutually exclusive, exhaustive, sovereign states. Hence, externally, a state is known 
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• The concept of the sovereign state and its implementation in post colonial 
Africa is a Western invention, and does not necessarily apply to all contexts. 
Thus, the Westphalian sovereign state might not be the only organisational 
option for a country.
• The term ‘failed state’ is misleading when studying Somalia. It implies that 
the only solution is a rebuilding of the former state, which is fatal first of all 
because it is assumed that there was a functional state apparatus previously, 
and secondly, in that it does not account for the governance structures that 
emerge in the stateless Somali society.
• Other entities than the state entities can aspire to be sovereign in the absence 
of the state. However, whether they do, relies on their ability to exert certain 
fundamental practices required for being sovereign.
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as sovereign when it is recognised by the other agents in the international society, 
that is, the other recognised states. Domestically, a state can be considered sovereign 
when it has the capacity to control the population and control its territorial borders. 
Although the two are said to be closely related, the organisational associations to 
each of them are differing. The domestic sovereignty is often referred to as order as a 
result of a vertical structure, whereas the external sovereignty implies a horizontal 
structure and thus a potential disorder (Shaw 2009; Haines 2008). The logic of these 
effects of the type of structure is according to Hobbes, that quality of actors brings 
about confrontation and eventually war, as every actor will always seek to dominate 
the others. This is avoided with the social contract in that there is a mutual gain for 
all contract holders, and thus a vertical structure is ensured (Slomp 2000: 34-41). 
Thus,  basically,  a  sovereign  ensures  the  absence  of  anarchy  within  a  country. 
Externally on the other hand, there is no sovereign, and thus, the domestic sovereign 
is to some degree dependent on being legitimate in the eyes of all external actors in 
order to ensure its own sovereignty domestically (Shaw 2009). As mentioned, we 
will discuss the aspects of external legitimacy further in chapter 5.
Domestically,  the  premise  from these  scholars  is  that  a  sovereign  should  be  an 
authority that has the capacity to control the citizens within its territory. Since these 
conceptualisations of sovereignty, a majority of scholars have based their work on 
the idea, that the sovereign is embodied in a state, as the state is understood in the 
West.  However,  as  mentioned,  Clapham and  several  other  scholars  have  started 
questioning if the concept of statehood is universal (Clapham 1996, Herbst 1996; 
2000). They argue that due to different histories and different contexts, states are not 
alike, and hence, that they should not be evaluated on the same background. For 
example,  African  States  should  not  be  measured  by  their  ability  to  live  up  to 
standards deriving from Western States. Therefore, the current insistence on reviving 
quasi states is generally ill advised. The alternative option then, is to derive on some 
notion of a state that accounts for the empirical differences, and thus makes a fair 
approximation to what is accomplishable and functional in the case of the African 
state. This could be done by  accounting for differences between states from their 
form of statehood instead of their  degree of statehood, that is represented by the 
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failed state literature (Clapham 1998).
Joseph Strayer defines the state as:
“the appearance of political units persisting in time and fixed in 
space,  the development  of  permanent  institutions,  agreement  on 
the  need  for  an  authority  which  can  give  final  judgments,  and 
acceptance of the idea that this authority should receive the basic 
loyalty of its subjects” (Strayer 1970:10).
This  conceptualisation  has  been  widely  criticised,  due  to  the  quite  broad 
understanding of the state by among others Charles Tilly (1975). But it also does 
have some qualities in relation to this paper. First of all, it is not bound up on the 
Western understanding of the state. Secondly, the broadness of it makes room for the 
empirical differences between states around the globe. Hence there is room to look 
into  other  political  units  or  authorities  than  the  state  from  the  Western 
conceptualisation, that can actually appear and take on some fundamental practices 
of governance, when the state in the conventional sense has failed, like it is the case 
in Somalia.  
The most important qualities in order to make a sovereign, is closely related to the 
‘agreement  on  the  need  for  an  authority’ (Brinkerhoff  2006).  So,  the  sovereign 
should be an authority,  however, this is tightly connected to legitimacy. From the 
idea of the ‘social contract’ between the sovereign and its citizens, we extract the 
fundamental assumption, that the sovereign should be legitimate. This is the essence 
of  the  social  contract;  the  citizens  voluntarily  accepts  to  give  up  some  of  their 
freedom in order to be protected by the sovereign.  According to Brinkerhoff,  the 
sovereign will have difficulties in functioning without these elements; authority and 
legitimacy (ibid.),  and we believe  that  this  fundamental  perception would be  the 
same, in developed as well  as in  developing countries.  Thus, when analysing the 
governance  abilities  of  the  UIC,  we  shall  employ  the  concept  of  a  ‘legitimate 
authority’ as our dependent variable.
But how does a non state actor like the UIC become legitimate and thus an authority 
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in the eyes of the citizens? Spears (2004) like Hobbes (1651) and several others, 
argue that provision of security is an important element (Spears 2004). In the past 
years, an increasing number of scholars have furthermore argued that rule of law is 
fundamental11. Alan Waites (2008) tries to put it all together in what he calls ‘survival 
functions’.  In  this  category  he  specifically  refers  to  security,  law  and  revenue. 
Revenue is added as he finds that it is a prerequisite to pay for security. The quality 
of rule of law lies in its capacity to make order predictable, and thus, to create trust,  
vertically as well as horizontally. The three practices are not exclusive, but correlated 
and to  some extent  mutually dependent.  Most  importantly,  it  is  argued that  they 
together are fundamental in making development in other areas within the country 
(Waites 2008: 7), and thus, they can be said to constitute the baseline for ensuring a 
legitimate authority.
To sum it up; In order to ensure governance, the key is to be a legitimate authority. 
We find that the following three parameters are crucial in ensuring this position in a 
society:
4.1.2.1 Approaching the Legitimate Authority
These above parameters;  the provision of  security,  the implementation of  a legal 
system/rule  of  law and  the  generation  of  revenue  will  be  used  in  the  following 
analysis to see, whether the UIC aspired to be a legitimate authority domestically.
Each parameter has its own part, and in each part we will supply with further theory 
on the qualities for this specific parameter, when considered beneficiary. Some of the 
theories  included  are  referring  to  the  common notion,  that  ‘the  state’ should  be 
11 For more on this, see e.g. Jensen 2008
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• The provision of security
• The implementation of a legal system – rule of 
law
• The generation of revenue
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ensuring each parameter. We have depicted these arguments using the term ‘state’. 
However, it should be noted, that we have only included these theories where we find 
it substantially unproblematic to equate ‘the state’ with any legitimate authority.
As touched upon above, the three parameters are somehow correlated in theory as 
well as in practice. As an example, the provision of security can be said to depend on 
the authority’s monopoly of violence, implying that the authority should have the 
capacity to ‘send somebody with a gun’ and punish whoever is not in line with the 
rules. Thus security is only for those who stay within the normative framework for 
acceptable behaviour.   Accordingly, the establishment of rule of law, traditionally 
created  through  a  judicial  system  capable  of  apprehending  and  punishing 
perpetrators, is also part of the ability to provide security. To that extend security and 
the rule of law is intertwined. Also, the generation of revenue is correlated with the 
others; it serves as a precondition for the provision of security and rule of law, but at  
the same time, revenue is  generally generated more easily when there is  a stable 
environment.  On  this  background,  we  shall  be  referring  to  each  of  the  three 
parameters  sporadically,  even though we have one part  specifically dedicated for 
each of them.
4.2 Security
Failed states are perceived as a security threat on several levels; locally, regionally 
and internationally. International studies of fragile states are often concerned with the 
potential for the conflict in fragile states, because it has implications for the stability 
of  the  international  system.  In  other  words,  security  in  fragile  states  is  often  of 
importance, primarily because of the threat this poses towards stronger states, leaving 
many security oriented studies towards fragile states as essentially state-centric. This 
has not only implications in the policy recommendations deriving from such studies, 
but  also  in  the  interpretation  of  the  relative  importance  of  certain  actors  and 
indicators. In such an analysis, the interests of domestic populations living in fragile 
states is not of primary importance (Carment et. al. 2010). Conversely, traditions in 
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human security focus on precisely these individuals rather than having stronger states 
as its primary reference.
Ideally, any study of fragile states should have the ability to analyse threats from both 
a  domestically oriented  analysis  framework as  well  as  an international  one.  This 
chapter, however, will deal with the domestically oriented security. 
In their  book, David Carment et.  al.  (2010) attempts to provide clarity about the 
concept  of  failed  and  fragile  states.  By  triangulating  large  data  samples  from 
organisations and case studies, they conclude that the fragile states in literature, are 
perceived to be a security risk to their people, and that security should be adressed as 
an indicator of fragility domestically, because:
Source: (Carment et. al. 2010: 72)
In broad terms the concept of human security contains everything that poses a risk 
towards the citizen on an individual level or as put by Mortensen as a “pursuance of 
freedom from threats“ (Mortsensen 1998: 14). In our case, this type of security is 
everything that makes the Somalis safe and secure, and are enabling them to act in 
everyday  life:  Freedom  of  movement,  opportunity  to  work,  to  farm,  to  feed 
themselves and sleep, with none or as little fear or physical harm as possible.
According to Tilly (1975), the security level in society can be measured through the 
accumulation and concentration of violence. The accumulation of violence refers to 
the amount of means of violence available, whereas the concentration of violence 
refers  to  how widely the  control  of  these  means  is  distributed.  The provision  of 
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a. They  lack capacity, resulting in a lack of basic security
b. They lack governance, resulting in the ineffecient and inequitable distribution of 
public goods
c. They lack control over violence within their territory, resulting in further divison 
and weakness, and the diffussion of conflict from other jurisdictions 
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security through the rule of law is however crucial in building legitimacy as part of a 
state  building  process.  In  ensuring  security,  or  what  could  be  termed  “peace” 
(whether the negative definition; the absence of violence or the positive; sustainable 
human security) it requires the control of the means of violence (Rubin 2008: 30-31). 
A number  of  variables  are  important  to  ensure  security,  such  as  resources,  but 
whether  the effort  of providing security as a public good within a given country 
succeeds, depends according to Rubin largely on the domestic legitimacy the effort 
can achieve (Rubin 2008: 32-34).
The UIC gained wide popular support because of several factors, first and foremost 
because they actually came to deliver on their promises, growing attractive to broad 
spectrums of the population. Islam was also an explanation, providing the UIC with 
both credibility and legitimacy in promoting Islamic values to  an almost  entirely 
Muslim population. While the secular mechanisms had been abused during the Barre 
regime, the Islamic values represented something pure which could not be exploited, 
with theft, rape and murder being strongly condemned through the Qu'ran. Of great 
importance in this respect is also the clan cleavages that savaged the Somali society 
after 1991 (see part 2.1.1.). The UIC managed to position itself as to represent almost 
all the clans present in society, not at least because it, contrary to popular belief, was 
not  a  complete  joint  movement  with  one  common agenda,  but  split  into  several 
factions, thus enhancing and broadening its scope of legitimacy within society. Thus 
the  UIC  based  part  of  their  legitimate  authority  and  their  capabality  to  provide 
security on their qulity of being able to symbolise and represent the existence and 
unity of the political community.
Traditionally, Somalia is presented as a country where anarchy reigns, with a low 
level  of  human  security,  little  value  of  life,  and  with  an  increasing  amount  of 
violence  and  criminality.  Under  these  anarchic-resemblant  circumstances,  a 
monopoly on violence seems to be challenged. It presents a case that is in lack of a 
legitimate authority. The establishment and spread of Shari'a courts, was a response 
to  this  situation  of  insecurity  and vacuum of  governance.  From the  international 
society there has been quite some speculations and fears as to if the UIC actually had 
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a hidden agenda of establishing a Caliphate in Somalia, and whether the courts were 
planning for  Jihad  (Marchal  2004:  114-115).  Although it  is  difficult  to  say what 
exactly was the intentions of the UIC, according to a press release issued in June 
2006, written by Sheikh Ahmed who was chairman of the courts in power, it was the 
goal of the UIC “to establish a system of governance in Mogadishu, and remove all 
the  checkpoints  and  terror  points  that  the  warlords  have  set  up  and  disarm  all 
criminal elements that endanger the peace in the city” (Ahmed 2006). That this goal 
was the aim of the UIC was also expressed by Francois Lonseny Fall – the Secretary 
General's  Special  Representative for  Somalia  in  2006,   who in a  résumé from a 
conversation with Sheik Ahmed stated: “Sheikh Sharif [Ahmed] briefed me on the 
recent events in Mogadishu and expressed his willingness to work with all parties 
who are interested in promoting peace in Somalia. He told me that the Courts did not 
start  the  fight,  but  had  no option  but  to  take  power from the  warlords  once  the 
fighting began.” (UNPOS 06.27.2006) 
Due to the absence of a law enforcing and executive body on state level, each court 
had its own militia in the beginning, and each militia and court were connected to an 
individual  clan.  Under  Sheikh Ahmed  the  Shura  founded  a  common  militia, 
consisting of combatants from all the different parts of the UIC (Shay 2008: 94). 
Areas of high insecurity were prioritised, particularly the main Bakaara market and 
other business centres and the people benefited from the new situation: “In the past I 
was robbed a number of times as I went to the market. [Now] I go and come back 
with everything” a small trader explained (Shay 2008: 99).
Following the takeover of Mogadishu, militias were disarmed and the UIC removed 
the  check-points  and roadblocks  in  an  attempt  to  stop  the  extensive  looting  and 
harassment of the people. The UIC militia policed the streets of Mogadishu, making 
the city safe for the first time since the late 1980s (Menkhaus 2007: 94). “Even those 
Mogadishu residents  who are  wary of  Islamic  extremism may welcome a  single 
group being in control of the capital for the first time in 15 years, saying there will at  
least  be  some  authority”  (BBC1  2006).  This  removed  the  immediate  threat  of 
intimidation,  extortion  and  sudden  attacks  and  assaults  from organised  crime  or 
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unorganised militias12, for both the common people and the business communities in 
the city.  The inhabitants of Mogadishu had easier and safer access to the market 
under the protection of the UIC
The UIC forces took over respectively the towns of Haradere and Kismayo, both 
with important strategic habours13, which would secure trade and taxation from these, 
but also hamper the reinforcement and capacity flow to the UIC's opposition. Taking 
the habour of Haradere effectively removed the reign of the pirates, which was a 
welcomed relief for the inhabitants (Shay 2008: 98).  Piracy was also forbidden and – 
it seems – stopped since no such incident was reported in the period where the UIC 
was in power. Moreover, the reopening of the habours in Haradere, Kismayo and 
Mogadishu meant that foreign aid could flow into Somalia, and that the UIC could 
reopen the trade lines, especially with the Middle-East (Shay 2008; Menkhaus 2009). 
The UIC, it seems, was therefore capable as the first aspiring power since 1991 to 
govern larger parts of their territorial domain, effectively enforcing some amount of 
order.
While the UIC emerged in and around the Mogadishu area, all regions experienced 
some  form of  bottom-up  governance  structures  emerging  in  the  wake  of  1991, 
creating some level of order and infrastructure. Particularly the Somali people in the 
North-West region, Somaliland, had to cope with a situation of  insecurity, primarily 
induced by the state pre-1991, which forced them to look for survival mechanisms 
provided by sub-state economic, social and legal arrangements, relying on everything 
but the Somali Central state (Menkhaus 2009; Brons 2001). While in South-Central 
Somalia  the UIC were prevailing,  in  Somaliland,  the Sheikh conference that  had 
taken place several years earlier, established security by other means. The conference 
was  an  inter-clan  reconcilation  initiative,  paving  the  way for  an  institutionalised 
national elderates (guurti). It endorsed an overall legal framework, binding for all 
parts  of the territory,  particularly with regards  to  the control  of violence and the 
provision of internal law and order, and external security. The arrangements included 
12 Shay uses the term ”freelance-militia” which covers sparsely organised persons or groups with 
access to and/or use of arms.
13 Kismayo possess two habours and an airport.
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the  essential  aspects  of  internal  security  provision  and  control  of  violence  that 
characterise state institutions (Brons 2001).
4.3 Rule of Law
Justice and rule of law has not traditionally been counted among the most important 
state functions.  It is, however, increasingly accepted that the rule of law, in varying 
degrees and in different contexts, is a prerequisite for security as well as legitimacy, 
not to speak of its impact on general predictability in society.  
There  are  debates  with  regards  to  whether  the  role  of  the  rule  of  law,  has 
circumvented its ability to shape behaviour. Some understands it as deriving from 
intrinsic values, arguing that legal systems shapes human conduct. Others claim that 
rules get obeyed when they reflect political realities (Jensen 2000; Whaites 2008). It 
is argued from the intrinsic point of view that often, and especially in post-conflict 
areas,  it  is  not  rules  but  norms,  costumes  and  conventions  that  are  the  primary 
mechanisms  that  shape  and  determine  the  behaviour  of  individuals.  These 
mechanisms  are  all  characterised  by  being  self-enforcing  in  the  sense  that  state 
institutions are not necessary in order to enforce them. Instead these mechanisms are 
working through individuals‘ motivation for a good reputation and through kinship 
ties  or  personal  relations  in  a  given  group  (Jensen  2008).  Opposite  to  these 
mechanisms there is the coercive enforcement, that is, legal coercion  state action, 
based on law. The problem with this is that the state has limited capacity for legal 
coercion. As put by Max Weber;
“Legal  coercion,  where  it  transforms  a  custom  into  a  legal 
obligation […] often adds practically nothing to its effectiveness, 
and, where it  opposes custom, frequently fails  in the attempt to 
influence actual conduct […] The chance of legal coercion which 
[…] motivates even “legal” conduct only to a slight extent, is also 
objectively an ultimate guaranty for no more than a fraction of the 
actual course of consensually related conduct [….] Only a limited 
measure of success can be attained through the threat of coercion 
supporting the legal order” (Weber as quoted in Jensen 2008: 121-
122).
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Among the implications of this insight in practice, is the fact that if new rules or 
institutions have targets that are not in line with norms, custom and conventions, they 
will  face  limited  chance  of  success  and  must  be  strategically  and  carefully 
implemented and monitored. The easier and more effective solution is therefore to 
introduce  new laws  that  are  somewhat  in  line  with  the  informal  constraints  that 
already exist. If too many rules and institutions that are not in accordance with the 
given local context in terms of norms, custom and conventions are introduced but not 
properly implemented, this will create cynicism and disrespect and thus undermine 
the authority of the formal rulers (Jensen 2008: 122).
Contrary  to  common  development  discourse  Jensen  (2008)  does  not  understand 
“justice”  as  a  sector,  but  more  of  an  institutional  phenomenon  that  includes 
institutional framework as well as substantial elements. The legal system that is to 
implement justice is diverse and dynamic, and there is no clear distinction between 
what  a  formal  legal  system should  perform as  to  what  is  up  to  semiformal  and 
informal  systems.  Even  when  focusing  solely  on  formal  legal  systems  it  is 
characterised  by  complexity,  and  as  Francis  Fukuyama  puts  it,  there  is:  “…no 
optimal specification of formal institutions and thus no optimal form of organisation, 
particularly for public sector agencies” (Fukuyama 2004b: 43)
The multiplicity in systems in Somalia has maybe decreased transparency for the 
external world since there is no one formal structure, however, these systems have 
provided  the  Somalis  with  a  menu  set  of  options  in  their  responses  to  the  state 
collapse. While the statutory law, decreed by the TFG serves a minimum of influence 
in  practice,  it  reflects  international  human  rights  standards  and is  internationally 
recognised.  Shari'a  is  commonly  recognized  as  legitimate  amongst  the  Somali 
population,  while  Xeer  is  the  most  far-reaching of  the  justice  systems,  and most 
effectively enforced, especially in the rural areas of the country.
After almost two decades of “state collapse”, four different justice systems can be 
identified in Somalia:
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(Le Sage 2005)
Xeer and Shari'a is greatly coherent, as outlined in part 2.2.1, but Somali customary 
law does have a separation between religion and customary law. In matters of family 
and inheritance, Shari'a law is supreme, but in cases where any conflicting views 
between Shari'a and Xeer should occur,  Xeer would normally take precedence as 
reflected  in  the  Somali  saying:  “Diinta  waa labaddali  karaa,  xeer  se  lam baddali 
karo” which translated means; one can change his religion; one cannot change the 
law (Ablele 2008).
When Somalia  is  mirrored as a  society with no respect  for  authorities,  it  can be 
traced  back  to  the  roots  of  Xeer,  in  which  the  government  is  prohibited  from 
interfering with the law, and in which there is no authority that dictates what the law 
should be, but each dispute is handled as a distinct by a council of judges. Somali 
difficulties adapting towards a central state, can therefore, to some extent also be 
explained by the fact that a wide-spread legal system exists, deeply ingrained in the 
Somali culture, which have great legitimacy among the population.
“Xeer  will  never  stop  being  used,  Xeer  is  stronger  than  any 
government's laws. The government laws don't satisfy the people; 
they do not bring about a sufficient  justice,  and so they do not 
bring peace between the groups”. Dahir Mohamed Grasi (Lombard 
2005).
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• Formal  judiciary  structures  in  regional  administrations  and  central 
governments created at  international peace processes,  the rules that are 
formally charted by TFG.
• The traditional, clan-based system known as Xeer.
• The  growing  number  of  Shari’a  courts  in  urban  areas,  particularly 
Mogadishu.
• Civil society and private-sector initiatives, as well as ad hoc mechanisms 
established by Somali militia-factions.
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Xeer is to large extent not as punishment oriented as Western penalty systems, and 
any given  penalty  is  often  put  on  the  collective  rather  than  the  individual.  The 
objective is not so much to punish the perpetrator as to maintain the relationships 
between clans. Partly because of the wide-spread acknowledgement of Xeer, Shari'a 
courts  are  rarely involved in  clan  conflicts,  and so  payment  of  diya  or  financial 
compensation between one clan and another, is left with the families, clans and sub-
clans. Shari'a judges, however, assert that there is no conflict between Islamic law 
and Xeer because “Somali culture was fully integrated into Islam and thus no conflict 
was possible” (Le Sage 2005: 39).
Shari'a courts and Xeer are both institutions of vital importance in security provision 
as they are both used in conflict resolution surrounding legal issues over resource 
competition,  pasture or water,  family affairs,  criminal  offences  and compensation 
payments (Brons 2001). A distinction can however be drawn between Shari'a and 
Xeer,  because  as  outlined  above,  Xeer  holds  the  lineage  responsible  for  the 
committed crime, whereas Shari'a holds the perpetrator personally responsible.
As described earlier Shari'a law has been a foundational feature of Somali society 
and incorporated into the state since the colonial era until its collapse. With Shari'a as 
the basis for national legislation, the governments in seat has been provided with 
some amount of symbolic legitimacy, although Shari'a has been most apparent within 
the formal justice system and mostly applied in common civil cases (Le Sage 2005). 
Since the beginning of 1990's, the Shari'a courts saw different combinations. Somali 
militia-faction leaders, businessmen, clan elders and community leaders have worked 
with Somali religious leaders from within their sub-clans to establish these courts in 
attempts  to  improve  local  security  conditions.  The  courts  play  the  role  of  both 
arresting criminals through organised militias, passing the legal decisions in criminal 
and civil cases, and were responsible for the imprisonment of the criminals (ibid.).
The first of these courts was the North Mogadishu court, in an area controlled by the 
militia-faction  leader  Ali  Mahdi  Mohamed from the Hawiye:Abgal  clan  with  the 
chairmanship of 15 judges under Sheikh Ali 'Dhere' Sheikh Mahmoud. Differences in 
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the  interpretation  of  the court's  objectives  existed  from the  beginning.  While  the 
former saw the court as an opportunity to re-establish security in his area, the latter 
believed that this was the first step towards establishing an Islamic state in Somalia 
(Le Sage 2005). While North Mogadishu became an increasingly secure location for 
local residents, it was also one of the very few places in Somalia where a Shari’a 
court implemented both corporal and capital punishment:
“A statement of punishments meted out by the court as of 31 July 
1996, included the amputation of both a hand and a leg for 17 
convicts, amputations of hands alone for another 12 convicts, the 
amputation of  a  leg alone  for  one  convict,  the  execution  of  11 
prisoners, beatings for 431 prisoners, 980 jail sentences and 527 
orders for payment of compensation” (Le Sage 2005: 42).
In  the  period  after,  a  series  of  other  Shari’a  courts  emerged  in  Hiran,  Middle 
Shabelle, Mudug, Nugal and Bari regions. By August 2006 there were 24 functioning 
Shari'a courts in Mogadishu alone, as well as eight outside the city, established for 
legal proceedings against criminals (Hansen 2006: 33). Rather than representing any 
militia-faction’s  political  agenda,  these  courts  generally  derived  from a  common 
interest among local actors in the community, who were willing to sacrifice a portion 
of their local revenue in order to improve local security conditions.
Matt Bryden (1999) understands in an early study,  the process of the creation of 
courts  as  an  emergence  of  a  'social  contract'  within  a  situation  that  was  before 
perceived as  anarchic.  This  is  consolidated  by Katie  Papagianni's  (2008) idea  of 
legitimacy that is, yet again, traced back to the Hobbesian idea of a social contract, 
where individuals accept the authority in return for some kind of security. In other 
words, in order for a authority to be legitimate it should have the ability to enforce 
rules, maintain order and promote economic growth, which again can be achieved 
through administration, policy development and implementation (Papagianni 2008: 
51).
A UN mission described the courts as follows:
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”They are multi-clan in composition and have had considerable 
popular  support;  they  have  exercised  the  right  to  collect  taxes, 
allocating revenues to pay for the running of the courts, provide 
small stipends to elders managing disputes, operate the prison, and 
maintain and control a Shari'a militia estimated at 500 men. The 
courts in Hiran base their deliberation on the Qoran, but do not 
impose Shari'a law – parties to a dispute or crime are entitled to 
opt  for  traditional  (blood  money)  compensation  or  Shari'a” 
(UNDOS 1999).
The structure of the courts tends to be simple, but nonetheless effective. They include 
a chairman, a vice-chairman and four judges, while a small militia was operating as 
police force,  reporting to the courts and implemented the courts‘ decisions, while 
also  working  independently  in  community  disputes  and  carrying  out  arrests. 
Moreover, a separate finance committee was collecting and managing tax revenues 
imposed on regional traders by the local administration (Le Sage 2005).
According to Papagianni, legitimacy is a participatory process that should include all 
key influential actors and make place for dialogue and debate as well as room for 
public participation. This is important as institutions “cohere if they emerge out of 
existing  social  forces,  if  they represent  real  interests  and real  clashes  of  interest 
which then lead to the establishment of mechanisms and organisational rules and 
procedures which are capable of resolving these disagreements” (Papagianni 2008: 
55).  Operating  with  a  legal  system  based  on  Islamic  law,  however,  offered  the 
challenges of settling on a single interpretation of Shari'a laws, which was a major 
challenge,  particularly  between  the  moderate  Sufi  adherents  and  the  more 
scripturalist  Wahhabists.  The  UIC included representatives  from different  Islamic 
movements, ranging from the militant AIAI that sought to establish a theocratic state 
in Somalia, to the anti-fundamentalist Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a that Sheikh Ahmed is 
associated with.
To settle disputes of religious interpretation between the different factions, the UIC 
was to be overseen by the Shura, consisting of 63 different Somali religious leaders 
as well as clan elders and businessmen who contributed to the court, drawn from 
various clans and Islamic movements. Despite the efforts to unite the interpretation 
of the scripts, no code of law was ever written down by the UIC. In spite of this, 
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most Somalis have knowledge on the Qu'ran and Shari'a laws, and the values and 
laws represented and enforced by the UIC came easier to become an integral part of 
society. It must, however, be noted that although differences existed, the majority of 
Islamic  organisations  that  have  been  visible  throughout  the  past  twenty  years  in 
Somalia, have been drawing on some of the same references, including Sayyid Qutb, 
Mawdudi and Hassan al Banna14 (Marchal 2004: 127-133)
Similar processes had happened in Somaliland earlier. Although not within the UIC's 
reach, Somaliland's latest constitutional ratification stated that all laws in Somaliland 
will be based upon Shari'a, and that all conflicts with Shari'a will be rendered void 
(Le Sage 2005: 27; Constitution of Somaliland). In Puntland too, although enforcing 
the judicial system prior to 1962, it is clear that no earlier laws would be applicable if 
they contradicted Shari'a (Le Sage 2005: 28; Constitution of Puntland). As it appears, 
the courts were linked to the rest of the communites, who supported the courts for 
several reasons. Firstly, the improved security conditions in the local communities, 
meant that faction leaders could maintain public support, as well as being a useful 
mechanism to  prevent  outbreak  of  conflict  with  neighbouring  clan  communities. 
Moreover,  the courts  provided security for Somali  businessmen who could profit 
from local  as  well  as  regional  trade  without  concern  of  uncontrolled  militia  and 
bandit  attacks.  Following  a  UN  study;  “The  traders  took  a  great  role  in  the 
establishment of the Islamic Courts with the intention of bringing back the basic law 
and order which allowed them the preparation of a conducive business atmosphere 
that  can  carry  out  business  transaction  from side  to  side”  (UNDOS  1998).  The 
private sector including factions, communities or businesses increasingly played a 
role in the justice matters within the country. They made use of former government 
judges and lawyers as well a an arbitration committee for settling legal disputes and 
to reach decision based on state law, Xeer and/or Shari'a. Shari'a, however, was often 
the  favored modality to  solve  business  disputes  because firstly,  its  jurisdiction  is 
unquestionable by the Somalias, and secondly because it – unlike Xeer – explicitly 
14 Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), was a prominent Islamist figure from Egypt and the leading member of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950's and 60's.  Mawdudi (1903-1979) was an islamist revivalist 
from Pakistan.  He  was  the  founder  of  Jamaat-e-Islami  which  is  the  oldest  religious  party in 
Pakistan.  Hassan  al-Banna (1906-1949)  was  an  Islamist  political  reformer  from  Egypt  and 
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928.
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recognises private property (Le Sage 2005).
4.4 Revenues
One  major  limitation  on  governance  is  revenue,  the  income  of  the  legitimate 
authority.  According  to  Margaret  Levi  the  greater  the  revenue  of  the  state  or 
authority, the more possible it is to extend the rule. Revenue enhances the ability of 
the ruler to elaborate the institutions of the state, to bring more people within the 
domain of those institutions and to increase the number and variety of the collective 
goods provided through the state  ”The history of state  revenue production is  the 
history of the evolution of the state” (Levi 1988: 1). Taxation particularly is a core 
governance function. It has the potential to shape relations between state and society 
because tax revenues allow states to provide security and public goods (Brautigam et. 
al. 2008). Therefore, taxation should be accorded an important role in analyses of 
governance. Today governments of many poor countries have depended heavily for 
revenue  on  taxes  on  commodity  exports.  Such  revenues  have  been  almost  the 
defining feature of poor countries from a public finance perspective  (ibid.). While 
the UIC did not impose any form of income tax on the heavily fragmented Somali 
population, other means were taken and taxes were instead imposed on markets and 
on harbours.  This however meant taking over a domain that since the fall  of the 
Siyad Barre regime, had been in the hands of the warlords and is therefore greatly 
coherent with security and rule of law both.
From colonial  times,  Somalia have received vast amounts of foreign aid,  making 
Somalia  dependent  on  external  resources.  While  external  support  may  seem 
necessary initally, it does not result in sustainability that is the product of internal 
revenues. Furthermore, the foreign aid came to be an integral part of the economy of 
war,  on  which  warlords  laid  their  claim.  The  most  common  way  of  generating 
revenues is via taxation, which demands some amount of organisation in society and 
entails a recogniton of authority, a social contract. Providing security comes with a 
financial cost. The UIC needed primarily to seize revenue in order to facilitate their 
courts and pay their own staff in the milita and the tax collectors, but they would 
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only be able to do so, if the roadblocks were dismantled, and the habors and airstrips 
liberated from the warlords (Hansen 2007). Shifting the revenue from the warlords to 
the UIC, empowered the UIC while weakening the competition and  the threat of the 
warlords militias.
During the period before the empowerment of the UIC, the economy in Somalia's 
southern and central part, could best be described as an economy of war and as being 
marked by extreme liberalisation, because the lack of formal state structures meant 
that society's  services were appropriated by private businessmen (UN Monitoring 
Group 2006: 36). Simultaneously, warlords controlled different zones and tried to 
keep  these  zones  secure  both  out  of  self-interest  but  also  to  the  benefit  of  the 
inhabitants.  At  times  the  warlords  were  required  by  the  local  population  or  the 
business community, to keep the area safe from looting, while in other incidents the 
militias of the warlords were the ones looting and creating havoc, hence the creator 
of  insecurity  (Menkhaus  2006).  When  a  militia  had  an  area  under  control, 
establishing  check-points,  collecting  taxes,  and creating  revenue,  another  warlord 
would see the opportunity to secure these revenues for themselves. In general, the 
heavy  looting  made  economy  unpredictable  and  minimised  the  chances  for  any 
authority to impose taxes in the already poor region.
As was mentioned above, particularly roadblocks resulted in extensive looting. Sheik 
Ahmed,  promised in June 2006 to put an end to this  extortion from the warlord 
milita, in which he succeeded (Ahmed 2006). “We have removed most of them and 
we intend to remove the remaining ones” said Sheikh Abdulkadir Ali the ICU vice-
chairman to IRIN already in June 29th 2006 (IRIN 2006). The effect of the removal 
of checkpoints was symbolic as well as real. The dissolving of the roadblocks meant 
a reduction, in some cases, of up to fifty percent of the delivery cost for goods and 
commodities (UN Monitoring Group 2006: 34).
Moreover,  the  UIC  occupied  nearly  all  airstrips  and  harbours  in  South-Central 
Somalia:  ”We  opened  back  the  airport  and  the  port,  after  consultation  with  the 
peoples and with their consent, we enforced minimum taxes, to expedite business”, 
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Sheikh Ahmed stated in 'Talk to Jazeera' in April 2007 (Al Jazeera 2007). The UIC 
managed to take over all these strategically significant capital points, securing trade 
and taxation from the captured towns and habours (UN Monitoring Group 2006)  and 
secure the stability needed for a reopening of tradelines.
As mentioned earlier, the UIC had strong links with the business community, that 
were also executive members of the Shura. The relationship between the UIC and the 
business community however, had a much broader scope. Due to the extreme amount 
of liberalisation in society, Somali business community consisted of approximately 
twenty very influential  business  men  whose  businesses  operated  in  nearly  every 
corner of the country and controlled the majority of resources. Business men had 
been financial supporters and political collaborators since the rise of the UIC during 
the 1990's. In a survey from the University of Bath, it  is reported that almost 69 
percent of the commercial enterprises in the study supported the Courts financially 
(Hansen 2007: 94). Hence, the business community was  a very important source of 
income for revenue, but it  was not limited to financial  services only.  In order to 
protect their  enterprises during the reign of the warlords,  many businessmen had 
employed militia, which on several occasions was employed by the UIC. In return, 
the businessmen took advantage of the security and business-friendly environment 
that  the  UIC  established,  which  among  other  things  included  lower  costs  and 
expanded opportunities for import (ibid.: 55).
4.5 Part Conclusion
This  chapter  has  investigated  the  UIC's  qualities  as  a  legitimate  authority 
domestically.  The  three  indicators  were  security,  rule  of  law  and  revenues 
respectively constituting the 'survival functions'  of a legitimate authority, and hence 
the results of the social contract citizen and authority in between. According to the 
UIC, the main drive behind the UIC's governance in South-Central Somalia was to 
establish peace and enhance security in the vacuum of governance that existed post-
1991. The individual courts were very different in form, function, and clan affiliation 
but  created  legitimacy in  society through Shari'a  law as  common reference.  The 
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UIC's reliance on Shari'a law, established legitimacy for its enforcement of law and 
order and security initiatives and united the population in spite of clan differences. It 
has been argued that the UIC stroke hard down on the warlords depriving them their 
opportunities of looting. The UIC did so by establishing several police forces and 
holding their own militia-factions, while incorporating a wide system of courts and 
judges. The effects were particularly noticeable in the takeover of roadblocks and 
checkpoints, and a decline in piracy, which resulted in both enhanced security for the 
individual citizen, but in particular for the business life, whose business opportunities 
increased significantly during the rule.  The UIC effectively came to control large 
parts  of  South-Central  Somalia,  establishing  security,  rule  of  law  and  creating 
revenues, until its fall late December 2006 when Ethiopia invaded.
5 EXTERNAL LEGITIMACY
According to Papagianni, “external sources of state legitimacy is often divorced from 
the state’s capacity to perform it’s tasks” (Papagianni 2008: 51). History has shown 
that sub state groups that do not look or behave like government officials as they are 
usually perceived, can take over governance tasks of providing public goods. Thus 
these groups can be capable of receiving legitimacy from the citizens, even though 
their exact goals and means might not be in accordance with the standards of the 
international society, like it is the case with the UIC15.
Papigianni's  statement  describes  the  situation  with  the  UIC quite  adequately.  As 
concluded in chapter 4, the UIC, a nonconventional sub state group, succeeded in 
getting  a  notable  degree  of  legitimacy  domestically.  However,  this  domestic 
legitimacy was not transformed into international legitimacy. In spite of the UIC’s 
achievements, Ethiopia backed by the US intervened and put an end to the heydays 
of the UIC. Part of the reason most probably lies in the assumptions to statehood that 
have  already  been  accounted  for;  the  assumption  of  sovereign  statehood  in  the 
western  sense,  that  has  been  operationalised  into  a  tradition  of  favoring  the 
15  Another recent example of this is Afghanistan where Taliban gained local support due to their 
ability of controlling local violence.
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strengthening and rebuilding of existing institutions instead of recognising alternative 
new authorities, that is, strong sub state entities (ibid.: 57-58).
In  this  chapter,  we  shall  focus  upon  the  UIC's  lack  of  external  legitimacy, 
consequently  leading  to  their  downfall  because  of  external  intervention.  When 
having  established  the  rules  of  recognition,  we  shall  discuss  which  international 
interests that were deciding for their lack of external recognition and compare these 
to the actual case. Finally, we shall approach the UIC in retrospective, considering 
the external threat that they constituted and discuss its value.
5.1 The Rules of the Game
In  chapter  4,  it  was  argued  that  reviewing  the  Somali  situation  according  to 
legitimacy, the UIC have gone to length with more measure of the different kinds or 
parts  of  domestic  legitimacy than the externally backed TFG. In an international 
perspective,  bringing  the  consistency  of  borders  deriving  from  the  Westphalian 
peace, and the mutual recognition through international legal sovereignty into play, 
we might get a better understanding of why then, the external lack of legitimacy 
came to be the end of the domestically legitimate authority; the UIC.
In International Relations the state is considered the one main actor (Jackson 2007). 
Following a long history of different types of state-like entities with different criteria 
connected  to  them,  dating  back  to  before  the  Roman  City-states,  the  essential 
requirement  for  the  modern  state  in  the  international  community,  is  that  it  is 
recognised by other actors in international society and is fulfilling the requirements 
of international law (Krasner 1999; Jabri 2008; Simpson 2008). The recognition of 
statehood is like joining an exclusive club of like minded peers. ”The sovereign state 
club” of the international communities have changed its admission requirements over 
centuries,  which  culminated  in  the   Peace  of  Westphalia,  while  the  Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties  of States codified the declarative theory of 
statehood as a part of customary international law in 1933.  
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This  convention expressed four  main  criteria  for  sovereign  statehood.  Firstly the 
state must have a population and a birth-rate to support it.  Secondly the state must 
have a defined territory, created by nature and above sea level16.  Thirdly the state 
must have a government that must show some efficiency in rule and administrative 
structure.  The  type  of  government  is  not  specified,  and  the  UN  today  counts 
democracies along with dictatorships, theocracies and monarchies.  Finally the state 
must possess the capacity to enter relations with other states, thus it has to recognise 
other states, some or all, and it must be able to engage in a minimum of diplomacy 
(Simpson  2008;  Montevideo  Convention  1933).  There  is  currently  192  member 
states  in  the  United  Nation  and  it  is  undoubtedly  one  of  the  most  important 
institutions in the international community.  The recognition itself  consolidates the 
acceptance of the three other requirements (Simpson 2008). Nevertheless, the terms 
of  recognition  are numerous  and not  set  in  stone – and rather  a  consequence of 
strategic interests than by the base of law (Shaw 2009, Haines 2008).
Somalia obtained membership in the UN in September 1960 where its borders were 
recognized  as  constituting  former  British  and Italian  Somaliland. Looking at  the 
Montevideo Convention's  claim of  just  statehood,  Somalia  both  has  a  population 
with a birth-rate, it has a territory, and it has de jure recognition as a territorial entity. 
The UIC was located within the territory, was composed of the population itself, and 
was  fulfilling the needs of a government through governance in 2006. Still the UIC 
did  not  enjoy  the  recognition  or  legitimacy  from the  international  society,  even 
though the UIC expressed wishes to enter into diplomatic international relations. “We 
would like to establish a friendly relationship with the international community that 
is based on mutual respect and interest and seek their support for the Somali peace 
process and respect their desire for peace” (Ahmed 2006).
Although  the  UIC  obviously  was  considered  an  illegitimate  actor  from  the 
perspective of Ethiopia and the US, it is important to notice that the UN expressed a 
different  and  more  moderate  understanding  of  the  UIC,  in  their  articulations  of 
wishes for mutual cooperation between the two parties, respectively the TFG and the 
16  With exceptions for geographical anomalies
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UIC. From the UN acts and requirements in the era of the UIC, it is on one hand 
indisputable that the UIC did not feature a degree of government that is required for 
it to be perceived as legitimate externally.  Yet on the other hand, the UN actually did 
acknowledge the presence of the UIC and their  legitimacy among the population 
within Somalia. Due to these mixed perceptions, attempts were continuously made to 
join the forces of the internal legitimacy that the UIC held with the international 
recognition that the TFG possessed;
“Underlining  the  importance  for  stability  in  Somalia  of  broad-
based and representative institutions and of an inclusive political 
process,  commending the  crucial  efforts  of  the  League of  Arab 
States  and  the  Intergovernmental  Authority  on  Development 
(IGAD) to promote and encourage political dialogue between the 
Transitional Federal Institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts, 
expressing its full support for these initiatives, and affirming its 
readiness to assist as appropriate an inclusive political process in 
Somalia […]. Urging both the Transitional Federal Institutions and 
the Union of Islamic Courts to unite behind and continue a process 
of dialogue” (UNSC Resolution 1725, December 2006).
Through the UN resolution, the emphasis on cooperation between the TFG and the 
UIC is  prevalent,  although with the TFG as  the formally recognised government 
from the international community. Not only does it imply that the UN acknowledged 
the fact of the minimum degree of control obtained by the TFG, but it furthermore 
reflects an acknowledgement of the UIC as the internal sovereign  and as the element 
to be embraced for an 'inclusive political process in Somalia' to take place, which 
again is an effect of the domestic reality outlined in chapter 4.
In spite of this informal recognition of the domestic legitimacy of the UIC, there was 
no protests to the TFG-backed Ethiopian intervention, and therefore, the  external 
legitimacy undoubtedly weighed higher.  The question is therefore, which interests in 
international  community  that  the  governance  of  the  UIC clashed  with,  since  no 
control was perceived as a better alternative, than the control factor that the UIC 
constituted.  The  answer  should  be  found  in  specific  threats,  as  perceived  by 
respectively Ethiopia and the US. Where  before, the failure of statehood in Somalia 
could be addressed somewhat isolated, the rise of the UIC came to be perceived as an 
external threat as a consequence of the failed central state.
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5.2 International Interests
Once a state is recognised as a sovereign state, the perks of the international society 
becomes  available.  Among  these,  and  most  predominant,  is  the  rule  of 
nonintervention.  First  established  with  the  Westphalia  peace  treaty,  and  later 
described by numerous scholars,  and adopted  in  the UN Charter,  article  2(4),  of 
1951; “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in  any  other  manner  inconsistent  with  the  Purposes  of  the  United  Nations.“ 
Ultimately, the rule of nonintervention ensures that sovereign states, once accepted 
by the  international  community,  can  stay clear  of  unwanted meddling  in  internal 
affairs (Haines 2008). Hence, the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, backed by the 
US, and justified by the TFG, implicates a perception of the UIC as an illegitimate 
actor, contrasting the interests of the external actors in play.
Ethiopia is the core of the countries in Horn of Africa, and have the position and 
strength to become the hegemonic power of the region, but as they are involved in 
most conflicts in the region, they cannot be acknowledged as one (Møller 2009). 
Even  still,  being  surrounded  by old,  potential,  and  actual  enemies,  they  have  a 
notorious large standing army counting some 200.000 troops (Morin 2007).  After 
the decolonisation, Somalia and Ethiopia were in several battles, as has been briefly 
outlined  in  the  historical  overview.  When  not  the  victim  of  Somali  aggressions 
towards Ethiopian territory,  Ethiopia has suffered heavily from the refugee flows, 
deriving from Somalia’s internal instability. During the reign of the UIC, Ethiopia 
weas continuously keeping troops within Somali territory, supported by the TFG and 
to great annoyance of the UIC, who considered it as an invasion and as a meddling in 
Somali domestic affairs (BBC October 2006). This escalated in the UIC declaring 
jihad  on their  neighbouring  country if  the  troops  were  not  removed,  tipping the 
balance and providing Ethiopia with a formal reason for intervention (Shay 2008; 
BBC December 2006).. The proclamation of jihad, Møller writes, was done as an 
element in the repeated negotiations between the TFG and the UIC, where the TFG 
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insisted on getting help from Ethiopia whereas the UIC rejected it, as it was “what it 
saw  as  [in  retrospect,  correctly]  a  clandestine  Ethiopian  military  intervention” 
(Møller 2009: 21, comment in original).
Evaluating Addis Ababas’ concerns and hence the Ethiopian intervention, it seems 
justified in the sense that one government, the internationally recognised TFG, asked 
another government for help. However, Møller suggests that it  in fact worked the 
opposite  way around; that  Addis Ababa asked the TFG for a  legal foundation to 
intervene (Møller 2009: 29). The Ethiopian invasion in Somalia was all other things 
equal, based upon a fear of the UIC succeeding in establishing a strong state with an 
antagonist  view  on  Ethiopia17,  or  as  put  by  Møller;  ”the  government  in  Addis 
[Ababa]  may  have  opted  for  the  second-best  solution,  i.e.  a  weak  state  which 
completely  depended  on  Ethiopian  support”  (Møller  2009:  28).  Nonetheless,  on 
invitation from the internationally recognised TFG, the rules of the game were not 
broken  when  Ethiopia  intervened,  although  the  de  facto  governing  authority 
considered it to be so.
The most interesting actor from an international assessment remains, however, the 
US. Not only were the US heavily involved in Somalia until mid-1990's, but their 
interests are linked directly to the Ethiopian intervention, or better put by Verhoeven; 
“Ethiopia did not intervene before they got an explicit approval from Washington” 
(Verhoeven 2009:  411).  The  main  incentive  for  the  US’ involvement  in  Somalia 
during the UIC was the assumption that has been sparked from the dogma of the 
9/11 - that failed states constitute a security threat not only to their own populations 
but to the international society as a whole. Security threats of the failed state are not 
limited to the threat of terror, however, this threat is the one that must be heavily 
emphasised when considering US involvement.18 Fukuyama is among the scholars 
17 It should also be noted that the UIC was supported by neighboring country Eritrea, that Ethiopia 
had tensions with as well (Møller 2009)
18 The report ”A more secure world; Our Shared Responsibility” published by the UN High Level  
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (2004) defines the threat of failed  states as ”economic 
and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; internal 
conflict,  including  civil  war,  genocide  and  other  large  scale  atrocities;  nuclear,  radiological, 
chemicial  and  biological  weapons  proliferation;  terrorism  and  transnational  organized  crime” 
(Carment et. al. 2010:68-75).  
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who  is  very  clear  in  stating  that  weak  or  failing  states  have  been  the  most 
predominant challenge to international order since the end of the cold war, and that 
since 9/11: “it has also been clear that they [the failed states] shelter international 
terrorists who can do significant damage to the United States and other developed 
countries” (Fukuyama 2004a: 125).
Seen  through  the  lens  of  Washington,  the  Islamist  advances  was  resembling  the 
Taliban conquest of Afghanistan; a religious grassroot movement that was devoted to 
uniting all tribes and install Shari'a law. Moreover, the CIA suspected the UIC of 
hosting East African terrorist and feared that al-Qaeda would obtain a new sanctuary 
(Verhoeven  2009:  415-416).  Indeed,  on  15  December   2006,  the  US  Assistant 
Secretary of State, Jendayi Frazer, warned against The Union of Islamic Courts; "The 
Council of Islamic Courts [Shura] is now controlled by al-Qaeda cell individuals, 
East Africa al-Qaeda cell individuals. The top layer of the court are extremists. They 
are terrorists," (Reuters 2006), which however was denied the same day by the UIC 
information secretary Abdirahim Ali Mudey (Shabelle 2010).
The War on Terror was launched by the US during President George W. Bush’ reign 
as  a  response  to  the  September  11th attack  and had as  its  objective  to  eliminate 
international  terrorism.  The  phrase  denoted  a  global  military,  political,  legal  and 
ideological struggle against organisations designated as terrorists and regimes that 
were accused of having connection to them, particularly militant Islamists and al-
Qaeda.19 Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA) is the name of 
the operation defined for combating terrorism specifically in the Horn of Africa, that 
focuses upon disrupting and detecting terrorist  activities in region. As former US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell has said, “terrorist activity might find some fertile 
ground there [in Somalia], and we don’t want that to happen” (CFR 2005). Bush 
government  officials  said  that  Osama  bin  Laden’s  al-Qaeda terrorist  network 
supported  Somali  radical  Islamists,  organised  training  camps  in  Somalia,  and 
threatened  American  troops  in  Somalia  who  were  there  on  a  UN  humanitarian 
mission in the early 1990s (CFR 2005).
19 For a more thorough explanation of  the Global war on terror,  see e.g.  David Brown,  2008 in 
Salmon & Imber (2008)
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If not before, it should be absolutely clear now that the UIC remained an illegitimate 
authority for the country of Somalia within the second half  of 2006 according to 
some actors in the international society, because they were perceived as constituting 
a  security threat,  more specifically from the US and Ethiopia.  Although the UIC 
sought to establish diplomatic relations with the external world and thus establish 
their  legitimacy  externally  as  well  as  domestically,  their  attempt  remained 
incomplete.  In  spite  of  establishing governance  in  a  country that  was commonly 
perceived  to  constitute  a  failed  state,  the  governance  structures  and  actors  in 
themselves, constituted a threat that – according to empirical findings – must have 
been perceived even bigger than no governance at all. 
5.3 Theoretical Considerations
The above being said, it is worth turning to question the validity of the theoretical 
assumptions of the connection between failed states and the fostering of terrorists. In 
a recent quantitative study Møller examines the statistical correlation between failed 
states and the fostering of terrorists. According to his findings, there is no statistical 
connection whatsoever;  terrorists  are  typically not  residents  nor  citizens  of failed 
states,  failed states  do not  serve as transit  areas  and failed states  are  simply bad 
hiding places in that the conditions in these countries makes it likely that bribes or 
the  offering  of  a  reward  will  lead  to  a  leak  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  wanted 
terrorists20 (Møller 2009: 15).
Looking at the catalysing case for the current debate of failed states and terrorism, al-
Qaeda, it turns out that neither their residence in Sudan nor in Afghanistan seems to 
have  been  chosen  because  of  their  quality  of  being  completely  ‘black  holes  of 
lawlessness’,  like  the  common perception  of   failed  states  prescribes.  Rather,  in 
Sudan they sought refugee in the areas where the government was in total control, 
and they left for Afghanistan, when they were asked to do so by the government. In 
Afghanistan they arrived when Taliban had established a level of control that had not 
been exceeded since the Soviet Union left the country (Møller 2009: 16). Based on 
20  The only exception to these conclusions is, if one defines terrorists as all armed actors in the 
country, but then that would make the correlation tautological.  
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Møller’s studies, it seems that terrorists are not attracted by completely lawless areas, 
but contrary are seeking for places where they can be protected by the government.
This has two implications. First of all it means that there seems to be no connection 
between terrorists and failed states, when failed states are understood in line with the 
mainstream  literature.  Secondly  however,  there  could be  a  connection  between 
terrorists and failed states, when failed states are understood in line with for example 
Verhoeven; that is ‘creative destruction’ where new forms of governance emerge. 
The essence is that the focus upon failed states in the common sense once again 
seems misplaced, as what really matters is if the authority in a country is ‘with us’ or 
‘against us’. Hence it seems that Washington’s preoccupation with hunting down al-
Qaeda,  and perhaps the festering  wound of  the humiliating ‘Black Hawk Down’ 
incident of 1993 when 18 US men lost their lives at the hands of Mogadishu’s faction 
fighters,  have  spurred  the  fear;  not  of  failed  states  as  such,  but  of  supposedly 
extremist Islamists getting control of Somalia. Moreover it seems that, not only this 
preoccupation, but also the common perception of statehood, 9/11 and the case of 
Afghanistan have produced the war on terror and the securitisation21 of the Global 
South,  justified  by  the  perhaps  not  so  justifiable  statement  of  the  deterministic 
relationship between failed states, or ‘black holes’, and the emergence of terrorists.
In line with the above argument and Bjørn Møller’s results, Verhoeven introduces 
what he denotes ‘the Orthodox Failed State Narrative’. His point is that it would be a 
great mistake to understand the postulated causal relation between failed states and 
terror as a deterministic, scientific fact. On the contrary, all parts of the Orthodox 
Narrative are very political simplifications of the complex, empirical realities. This 
goes for the interpretation of who has failed and who has not, the explanations on the 
reasons and the dynamics of failed states, and the understanding of what happens in 
the context of state collapse (Verhoeven 2009: 406). The story of the anarchy of 
failed  states,  as  well  as  the  narrative  that  this  anarchy  necessarily  leads  to  the 
fostering of terrorists are both part of an ideological agenda, based on little empirical 
21 The Copenhagen Schools term ’securitization’ is by Barry Buzan et al described as follows: “The 
exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of  
an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects” (Buzan et al 
1998: 25).
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evidence (Verhoeven 2009: 411); He states that the securitization of the Global South 
is a consequence of this narrative:
“[The orthodox failed state narrative]Is by no means an innocent 
phenomenon. The continuous  portrayal  of  Africa,   the continent 
that  has  least  embraced  globalisation  ,  asperilous  serves  wider 
purposes: the Orthodox Failed States Narrative is part of a wider 
ideological paradigm that tries to consolidate contemporary power 
relations  and  posit  a  very  specific  political-economic  paper  as 
universal” (Verhoeven 2009: 418).
Following up on this Bjørn Møller states, that it would be misleading to assume that 
the  vital  actors,  most  predominantly the  US,  are  motivated  by realities  as  such. 
Rather they are led by their beliefs, “however ill-funded and erroneous these may be” 
(Møller 2009: 16).
The above dismissal  of  the  failed state  narrative does  obviously not  exclude the 
possibility that the UIC actually was a potential terrorist threat; UIC could in fact 
have had been cooperating with al-Qaeda, if they were willing and able to provide 
the required facilities to be a Safe-haven. However, it does imply that the concern is 
more about finding the ‘right government’ instead of just finding ‘a government’. 
The paradox from the international community is thus, that while the failed state 
demands the rise of some amount of order, it does not equal legitimation of any kind 
of order.
5.4 The UIC in Retrospective
In a figure published by Bjørn Møller (2009), it is stated that whilst the TFG, not 
surprisingly from the above, has connections to dominant states in the West, then 
different factions of the UIC has connections with partners commonly perceived as 
less credible from a western point of view. Among these are Egypt, Yemen and Iran 
(Møller 2009:25).
One fraction of the UIC that at least in theory could have been posing a threat is the 
AIAI.  The AIAI  has its  offspring in  the Muslim Brotherhood and is  based upon 
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Wahhabism,  which is considered an ultra-conservative orientation within  Salafism. 
Sheikh  Hassan  Dahir  Aweys  is  one  of  its  leaders,  and  he  is  on  the  US’s  and 
subsequently UN’s lists of suspected terrorists22. Moreover, due to the fragmentation 
and decentralised character of the Islamic courts, it does seem hard to say anything 
general about the position and ambitions of the UIC. Even the coordinating body, the 
Shura,  apparently  sent  mixed  messages,  some  putting  emphasis  on  peace  and 
stability  while  others  were  focusing  on  strict  implementations  of  Shari'a.  One 
example of the extremism was one Shura member who opted for shooting people 
who did not pray five times a day (Møller 2009: 21).
Nonetheless, although some minorities opted for strict interpretations of Islamism it 
does not necessarily equal that they had ambitions of creating a worldwide Caliphate 
that should be achieved through jihad. It could mean though, that basic human rights 
were violated in some cases, but this was never the concern of either Ethiopia or the 
US.
According  to  Verhoeven  (2009),  Somali  Islam  has  suffered  from  massive 
misunderstandings. It seems unrecognised that Islam has actually been the unifying 
force throughout  history and across clans,  which has only been accomplished by 
being tightly linked to cultural, traditional practices, and that moderate Sufi inspired 
Islam has been dominating. Therefore, Verhoeven suggests that the Islamic courts 
should be understood in the context from where they arose in 1990; there was no 
order, and  they aimed at ensuring exactly this; there was no unity, and hence, they 
wanted to establish exactly this. This theory matches the declaration made by the 
UIC when they first took over Mogadishu; an official promise that they wanted to 
unite Somalia under the banner of Islam in order to ensure peace, security and justice 
(Verhoeven 2009: 111-115; Sheikh Ahmed 2006).
Either way, it should be noted that Islam and Shari'a in fact were not new in being the 
foundation of  laws,  at  least  not  formally.  In  article  8  of  the  Transitional  Federal 
Charter  from  2003  it  is  stated  that  “Islam  shall  be  the  religion  of  the  Somali 
22 However, while they might have been radical before the civil war, after it  ended they abandoned  
their armed struggles, instead focusing on commerce and charitable work (Møller 2009:11-12)
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Republic,”  and  that  “The  Islamic  Shari'a  shall  be  the  basic  source  for  national 
legislation” (National Legislative Bodies, Article 8.2). Back then, this was supported 
by the international society.
5.5 Part Conclusion:
The lack of external legitimacy in the international system of states effectively came 
to be the end of the UIC. This chapter has discussed some of the impact and interests 
that seem to be of vital when understanding the UIC's lack of external legitimacy in 
spite of legitimate authority domestically. From the above, the external response to 
the UIC was based more on a perception of them posing a terror threat, than on a 
need to address a lack of governance. It can be concluded, that the value-set of the 
UIC was not perceived in accordance with western doctrine, particularly after 9/11, 
and therefore, that no governance came to be a better solution than any governance 
from the view of Ethiopia and the US particularly.
6 CONCLUSION
In  this  paper  we  have  addressed  the  absence  of  a  functional  state  apparatus  in 
Somalia. The theoretical point of departure is a dismissal of the mainstream and one-
dimensional  assumption  of  the  state  being  a  static,  eternal  condition  that  can  be 
achieved in all parts of the world and therefore, that all states should be evaluated as 
such. The empirical point of departure is the collapse of the Somali state apparatus in 
1991 that has been approached from the above mentioned theoretical framework, 
meaning that the one-sided goal of international actors, has been to re-establish a 
state apparatus that was never fully consolidated in a Somali context.
We have argued that the perceptions of the failed state, that is deriving from an Euro-
centric perception of statehood, neglects the essentially decentralised nature of the 
Somali society, and consequently; that international attempts of restoration, leads to 
wrong approaches when relying on reconstruction of a state that was never solidified 
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within Somali borders.
The collapse of the Somali state apparatus and the events that followed does fit the 
failed states characteristics put forward by Zartman meaning that ‘structure, authority 
(legitimate power), law, and political order had fallen apart, and it also resulted in 
tension, violence and deep conflict by warring factions, that was outlined as failed 
state markers by Rotberg. This situation, however, did not equal an end-stage for 
Somalia.  As acknowledged by Zartman,  a  failed state  does  not  necessarily equal 
complete anarchy, although this is where mainstream reasoning stops. Rather, new 
governance structures emerged, among these, and most prominently, the UIC.
The UIC managed to establish unity across clan lines with a common reference to 
Shari'a law in their governance. Throughout the half year with the Union of Islamic 
Courts in power, they established themselves as provider of essential public goods 
that  was  able  to  collect  revenues,  establish  rule  of  law,  and  perhaps  most 
comprehensible for the Somali population – they ensured a level of security not seen 
since before the collapse of the Barre-regime. Hence, they  managed to constitute 
themselves  as  a  legitimate  authority  domestically  fulfilling  the  tasks  normally 
perceived to be the responsibility of the state.
In spite of domestic legitimacy, the rule of the UIC was effectively brought to an end 
when Ethiopia, backed by the US, intervened in late December 2006.  State-centric 
security interests  in the international community weighed heavier with regards to 
recognition  of   their  governance  than did  domestic  legitimacy.  Consequently,  the 
incongruence between domestic and external legitimacy, came to be the downfall of 
the  courts,  leaving  yet  again  Somalia  in  a  worse  state  than  before  external 
interference.
7 PERSPECTIVES
The  implications  of  perceiving  Somalia  as  a  failed  state,  in  the  meaning  of  a 
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breakdown of the conventional state apparatus, and the assumption of the correlation 
between failed states and terrorists, have massive implications that all together seem 
to constitute a vicious circle, with negative consequences fueling further negative 
results.
The Ethiopian intervention in December 2006 and consequently the downfall of the 
UIC, came to mean that whichever amount of control that was established before was 
effectively removed, making no one have any control at all for a period. The situation 
is described by Bjørn Møller:
“Since the overthrow of the UIC, things have gone from bad to 
worse in almost all respects. A humanitarian crisis has developed, 
the likes of which the troubled country has not experienced since 
around  1991,  featuring  huge  numbers  of  internally  displaced 
persons  and  refugees,  mainly  in  Kenya  and  Ethiopia—and  the 
emergency  relief  coming  in  from,  e.g.,  the  UN’s  World  Food 
Programme (WFP),  being attacked and looted by both warlords 
and highway robbers  and by pirates….As a consequence, Somalia 
has  the  highest  rate  of  malnutrition  in  the  world,  according  to 
UNICEF, seventy percent of the population being without access 
to potable water. A total of 3.2 million, i.e. nearly half of the entire 
population remained  in  urgent  need  of  humanitarian  assistance” 
(Møller 2009: 22-23).
The TFG was in power as long as the Ethiopian troops were present, but lost ground 
immediately after their withdrawal. In the middle of this chaos al-Shabaab emerged, 
more  radical  and  much  more  orthodox  than  the  UIC  anno  2006.  Presently,  al- 
Shabaab is  in power of major parts  of South-Central  Somalia (Information 2010, 
Møller 2009: 23, Krath 05.16.10).  When asking Rasmus Krath what the plan to get 
Somalia back on track could be in the current situation, he sarcastically suggested to 
learn  from  the  fatal  mistakes  that  have  been  done  already,  in  order  to  prevent 
repetitions in other countries (Krath 05.16.10). Bjørn Møller's response was that no 
one had the slightest  idea on what  to  do,  but  what  could be concluded was that 
everything done so far had led to a bad result (Møller 03.12.10). Thus, as it looks 
right now, Somalia is in a stage where it is very far from being fixable.
In an  article  from the Times,  December  2009,  Martin  Fletcher  calls  Somalia  the 
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“greatest victim of President Bush's war on terror (Times 2009)”. He argues that the 
war on terror:
“has delivered a people that practised a moderate form of Islam 
into  the  hands  of  religious  extremists.  Its  efforts  to  combat 
terrorism have turned Somalia into a launchpad for global jihad. 
Somalia is now the ultimate failed state whose mayhem threatens 
to  destabilise  the  region  and  whose  pirates  maraud  the  vital 
shipping  lanes  off  its  shores.  Its  people  endure  Africa’s  worst 
humanitarian crisis”(Times 2009)
It  is  impossible  to  determine  what  would have  happened and what  the  status  of 
Somalia would have been today, had Ethiopia not intervened. It is however possible 
to  argue that  the  Somalia  we know in  the  year  2010 constitutes  a  much greater 
security threat towards the international community as well as towards itself, than 
during the UIC in 2006. And Martin Fletcher is not alone in his judgment of the case; 
according  to  Rasmus  Krath,  the  rise  of  al-Shabaab  and  the  rabid  and  extreme 
jurisdiction  they  have  implemented  was  a  direct  consequence  of  the  Ethiopian 
intervention and the downfall of the UIC. Also according to Bjørn Møller, the most 
supportive  factor  to  the  radicalisation  and  growth  of  al-Shabaab  was  that  the 
Ethiopian intervention allowed them to combine two agendas – the religious and the 
patriotic. According to Bjørn Møller what fueled the fire was the major US launched 
strike in Somalia May 1st 2008, killing al-Shabaab's military leader  Aden Hashi 
Ayro (03.12.10). The difference between al-Shabaab and the Union of Courts was 
consolidated when the former UIC president Sheikh Ahmed was elected as president 
for the TFG in February 2009, with the result of al-Shabaab declaring war on his 
person, in spite of support from a global council of Islamic clerics lead by  Sheikh 
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi23. The current prospects are not too bright, Verhoeven states that:
“ The Orthodox Failed States Narrative is mono dimensional and 
self-serving,  and  leads  to  a  disconnection  with  local  realities, 
ultimately  developing  into  a  self-fulfilling  prophecy  in  which 
interventionism to ‘‘root-out  terror’’ ends  up creating more,  not 
less, regional insecurity” (Verhoeven 2009: 406).
23 Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi is the head of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), 
and the president of the International Association of Muslim Scholars (IAMS).
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Fletcher supports this statement; in the end of his article he argues that “Today al-
Shabaab controls much of Somalia and most of Mogadishu. It has morphed into a 
jihadist movement with ties to al-Qaeda” (Times 2009). Indeed it does seem, in the 
words  of  Harry  Verhoeven,  to  be  a  self  fulfilling  prophecy  of  the  failed  state 
(Verhoeven 2009).
7.1 Policy Implications
The international  agenda of today reflects an agenda focusing upon international 
cooperation with the different states as key actors in the process. The increasing and 
still  more  ambitious  goals  for  statehood has  narrowed the  template  for  the  state, 
leaving many developing states as deviating from Western ideals. The problem is that 
the  international  community  does  not  apply  these  equally  when  judging  the 
legitimacy of different states around the world. And perhaps more problematic, the 
parameters used to evaluate a country, for example measuring democracy on if there 
is  elections  or  not,  does  not  necessarily  contribute  to  domestic  legitimacy 
(Papagianni 2008: 54). External legitimacy and the future path of Somalia, in the 
post-9/11  era  in  the  western-dominated  international  agenda,  is  interpreted  by 
Verhoeven to mean that:
”...  the long-term solution to reversing state-failure lies in the [...] 
‘‘End of History’’: reviving a minimalist, pro-Western state, which 
embraces neoliberal  globalisation, the magic of laissez-faire and 
electoral democracy. For neocons, a ‘‘lean’’ state, private property 
and  deregulated  marketplace  are  entirely  natural  de  facto  a-
political and universal, and hence perfectly exportable via military 
force and imposable via decree by ‘‘Green Zone’’ technocrats […] 
Convinced of the Muslim World’s thirst for ‘‘freedom’’, the Bush 
administration assumed that military walkovers in Afghanistan and 
Iraq could be translated into political triumphs as power would be 
handed over swiftly to Western minded elites” (2009:409)
The main cause of the problems in the current Somali framework, seems to be the 
idea that the Western ideal of statehood is perceived as the right solution for all parts 
of the world. As long as this assumption remains by far unchallenged each new crisis 
occurring in the global South will be perceived as yet another problem that is caused 
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solely by internal  problems and therefore must  be solved only domestically.  The 
alternative to this would obviously be to avoid the reigning essentialism by turning 
the  page  and  start  realising  that  the  problems  lie  in  the  heart  of  the  western 
assumption of the state that has been enforced, yet not adjusted, to all parts of the 
world. Only when the emerging bottom-up governance structures in response to the 
failing state will gain acceptance, not only domestically, but internationally as well, 
can global and domestic security and the wishes of the Somali people be addressed 
effectively.
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